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C00036554 achieve surprise in at least one of these. Thus, for example, if intentions cannot be concealed, it may still be possible to conceal timing (cry-wolf syndrome), place, strength or style.

This assertion is for the most part self-evident. An interesting aspect of the closing sentence which relates to the phenomenon of conditioning is the debilitating effect of the "cry-wolf" syndrome. Figure 3 provides several quotes that illustrate the desensitizing effect of false alerts; at Pearl Harbor, Darwin, Vietnam, Korea, and Israel 1973. The parallelism of the quotations is striking.

There can be no doubt that "cry-wolf" is an established element in the folklore of indications and warning. Equally, there should be no doubt that such concern is justified by historical evidence. Figure 4 shows various cross tabluations and a statistical analysis of the historical data involving deception, false alerts, and resulting surprise. In particular, the data show that when one or more false alerts preceded the military engagement described in the case (the definition of "cry-wolf" in the table), surprise resulted in 92 percent of the cases. Where this was not