Page:CIAdeceptionMaximsFactFolklore 1980.pdf/19

C00036554 intuitive inference. Originally adduced from an analysis of the deficiencies in research design of the experiments of psychologists which showed that these scientists had "seriously incorrect notions about the amount of error and unreliability inherent in small samples of data" (24), this cognitive bias appears to be quite widespread.

It is not difficult to find instances of the same phenomenon in political/military decison making. Figure 2 provides three interesting examples, the lack of alertness of German troops on the eve of the Normandy invasion, Stalin's belief that the Germans would issue an ultimatum prior to any invasion of Russia, and the view expressed by some analysts that Krushchev would not place offensive missiles in Cuba. In each example a critical inference was drawn on the basis of a very small sample size. Later in this discussion, the results of Axelrod will be summarized which call to question whether any inference can be drawn from the data in these examples. It is sufficient in this context to note the imprecision of binomial estimates from small sample sizes.6

Another limitation of human information processing relevant to deception planning is the frequent inability