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 senous planning in Washington for the inclusion of selective assassination proposals in PBSUCCESS. Returning from Washington to, on 2 June 1954, however, reported to his staff that the consensus in Washington was that “Arbenz must go; how does not matter.”



On 16 June 1954 Castillo Armas’ CIA-supported force of armed exiles entered Guatemala. While these forces advanced tentatively in the hinterland, Guatemala City on 16 and 17 June met with a leading Guatemalan military commander, in the hopes of convincing him to lead a coup against Arbenz. In these discussions, the military commander hinted he would like to see, killed. The, frustrated by the continued inaction of the Guatemalan military commander, told him that if he wanted them killed he should do it himself. Despite the Guatemalan military commander’s vacillation, a cable indicated that he remained convinced that  had to be eliminated.

With the Guatemala Army’s position uncertain and the outcome still in doubt, a few days later, the chief, in, requested permission to bomb the  and. LINCOLN responded on 22 June that it did not want to waste air strikes on or  while a battle was raging at Zacapa. The and  also supported the  chief's request to bomb  with a dramatic cable which ended “Bomb Repeat Bomb.” LINCOLN and Headquarters held fast and  was never bombed. “We do not take action with grave foreign policy implications except as agent for the policymakers,” Dulles cabled LINCOLN.

President Arbenz, on 27 June 1954, in a bitterly anti-American speech, resigned his office and sought asylum in the Mexican embassy in Guatemala City. . After Castillo Armas assumed the presidency, however, Arbenz was allowed to leave the country for Mexico, which granted him political asylum. In addition, 120 other Arbenz government officials or Communists departed Guatemala under a safe passage agreement with the Castillo Armas government. There is no evidence that any Guatemalans were executed.



CIA officers responsible for planning and implementing covert action against the Arbenz government engaged in extensive discussions over a two-and a half year period about the possibility of assassinating Guatemalan officials. Consideration of using assassination to purge Guatemala of Communist influence was born of the extreme international tensions in the early Cold War years. The Agency did not act unilaterally, but consulted with State Department officials with responsibility for policy toward Latin America. In the end, no assassinations of Guatemalan officials were carried out, according to all available evidence.