Page:CIA and Guatemala Assassination Proposals, 1952-1954 (1995).djvu/7

 Guatemala] must be taken.” In response to a question of whether Guatemalan was “salvageable,”  replied in the negative and suggested “he be eliminated.”

On 16 May 1954 the Officer at  proposed in a memorandum to  the new Chief of  and  now serving as  that assassination be incorporated into the psychological part of PBSUCCESS. The Officer laid out a specific assassination schedule leading up to D-Day, the actual invasion by Castillo Armas. He proposed a raid on on D12D-12 [sic]. This was to be a show of force; no one was to be harmed and the attack was to take place when was absent. The Officer, however, proposed the disposal of, on D-10 as a means of paralyzing the. The Officer suggested that  be killed on D-8. This would, according to the Officer, eliminate the  character of the Arbenz regime. The Officer called for the disposal on D-6 of  in the Guatemalan Communist Party (PGT). This would leave Guatemala’s believed. On D-4 would be eliminated. was to be eliminated so that the rebel forces would not have to worry about him or deal with him after victory. The Officer considered the possibility of reprisals as a weakness in his scheme, but decided that “such actions were expected anyway.” The  Officer argued that his proposal, if adopted, would not only be physically impressive but psychologically significant by providing a show of strength for the opposition. It would also “soften up” the enemy. He added that his first three suggestions had the previous approval of.

On 21 May asked Headquarters for permission to implement the  Officer’s proposal and asked for suggestions about the specific individuals to be targeted. No reply from Headquarters to has been found. On 29 May 1954, however, the chief requested the names of the “four men” he and the  Officer discussed assassinating. More than likely, the chief wanted to take up the issue again with Castillo Armas. Again, no cable reply from Headquarters or has been found. At the same time, continued compiling information on  and lists of home addresses for individuals named on the “disposal list” drafted in April. believed was a “worthy target.”

Meanwhile, traveled to Washington and submitted a proposal on 1 June 1954 that suggested that as an alternative approach to the paramilitary action program “specific sabotage and possibly political assassination should be carefully worked out and effected.”  took up  suggestion in discussions with  on 1 and 2 June. According to considered the proposal and then ruled it out, “at least for the immediate future,” on the ground that it would prove counterproductive. wanted more specific plans concerning the individual targets, timing, and statement of purpose. Both and  agreed that the advantages gained by this type of activity needed to be clearly spelled out. This appears to be the end of