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 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA-RDP01-00707R000200110024-7

4. Attitudes

East Germans still think of themselves as Germans, although their attitudes toward the German nation have been modified by more than 25 years of Communist rule. Some elements still cling to the hope of reunification, kept alive by improvements in travel, transport, and communications negotiated by the four powers holding residual rights in Germany as well as by the two German states. However, the trend toward international recognition of both German states is well under way. The average East German seems to have become resigned to the system imposed upon him; at the same time he has developed a certain sense of pride in the economic development of East Germany. Most members of the ruling elite, on the other hand, remain uneasy about the future, fearing that the Soviet Union is all too prone to sacrifice the interests of the East German regime in order to further purely Soviet interests in Europe, particularly to promote better relations with West Germany. Under Ulbricht, the regime was also uneasy about any signs of liberalization in the U.S.S.R. and Eastern Europe because it feared that this could lead to criticisms and "suggestions" for easing the harshly repressive rule of the SED. Under Honecker, the regime is more relaxed, pursuing a formally correct line ideologically and constantly reiterating its loyalty to the U.S.S.R., but at the same time adopting practical economic and cultural measures designed to ease the people's lot and win public support.

The government's first efforts to consolidate its control by constructing the Berlin Wall in August 1961 met with plummeting public morale and a feeling of hopelessness, isolation, and resentment toward the Western powers. During the brief period of relaxation of domestic pressures in 1963-64, many East Germans regained self-confidence and expressed their desire for improved living conditions and a reduction in travel restrictions. Intellectuals, churchmen, and young people resisted regimentation whenever possible. Writers and artists gave lip service to the regime but went their own way and hoped that some liberalization in the U.S.S.R. would force East Germany to follow suit. Evangelical and Roman Catholic Church leaders reiterated their churches' stand against Marxist doctrine and certain types of political collaboration with the regime, although both churches tacitly accepted the regime as the duly constituted authority. Young people, unable to travel freely in the West, tried to incorporate bits and pieces of Western culture gleaned from radio and television into their own sterile surroundings. The results of the 11th SED plenum in December 1965, when the regime resorted to more stringent sanctions against freethinking individuals and dissident youth, served to notify the populace that freedom was still illusory. The subsequent trial and imprisonment of Soviet writers Yuliy Daniel and Andrey Sinyavskiy crushed whatever hopes remained among East German intellectuals that deliverance from the regime's sanctions would come via a wave of Soviet liberalism.

The East German citizenry perked up during the "Prague spring" of 1968 and, despite regime efforts to manage the news of the liberal Dubcek reforms, the populace closely followed developments by listening to Radio Prague and Western news services. News of the occupation of Czechoslovakia on 20-21 August triggered more than 4 weeks of sporadic demonstrations by East German youth as well as other acts of defiance against the regime's support of and participation in the invasion. Thousands of East German citizens visited the Czechoslovak Embassy to express their sympathy and sign the guest register. East German authorities finally placed a guard in front of the embassy to turn people away. A number of young people were arrested for expressing support for Dubcek in open demonstrations in cities throughout East Germany. Many of the demonstrators were children of ranking party members and leading intellectuals, such as the sons of the controversial Prof. Robert Havemann. The regime moved quickly to stifle the dissidence and launched a campaign to test party loyalty and increase ideological reliability within the party and among teachers, intellectuals, and other professional people. Many of the demonstrators were tried and given light sentences or remanded to the custody of their parents. If the parents held important positions in the regime they sometimes were demoted, probably in an effort to drive home the decrees on parental responsibility. Although these scattered popular protests never presented a serious threat to regime security, they led to a period of increased vigilance by the nervous East German authorities.

Realizing that constant tension did not produce the desired results, the new regime under Honecker introduced a panglossian approach to social problems, insisting that life in East Germany was the best of all possible worlds, in the example of the U.S.S.R., of course. At the same time Honecker called for more and better consumers' goods and housing, an end to the petty annoyances afflicting public services, greater opportunities to travel within the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, more interesting films, radio, and television, and greater efforts by artists, musicians, and writers to enrich the everyday life of the working class.

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APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA-RDP01-00707R000200110024-7