Page:CIA-RDP01-00707R000200110019-3.pdf/39

 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA-RDP01-00707R000200110019-3

2. Countersubversive and counterinsurgency measures and capabilities

The regime still lacks the total support of East Germans, but the discontent which exists is mainly of the grumbling variety and is unlikely to lead to large-scale demonstrations or riots. This can be attributed not only to the well-disciplined police and intelligence forces, but also to policy decisions made by the top SED leadership aimed at preventing minor problems from developing into serious disputes. Public demonstrations of dissatisfaction are quickly and easily controlled by security personnel who have demonstrated their loyalty by carrying out even the most odious tasks, such as firing on citizens trying to escape over the Berlin Wall.

The SED bureaucracy controls and aids the police forces in fulfilling their security functions. The party leadership in East Berlin is regularly informed about the state of public opinion and often quietly intervenes in situations which have the potential for leading to civil unrest of left unresolved. It is not unusual for SED leader Erich Honecker to concern himself with minor contentious problems.

The agreements reached by the two Germanies in mid-1972 to facilitate visits of West Germans to the GDR aroused fears of a large influx of West Germans, and certain categories of governmental officials were refused permission to receive Western relatives. There have been no indications, however, that the visits are creating security problems for the government.

In the event of civil disturbances which the East German security forces could not handle, the regime could count on the intervention of the 300,000 Soviet troops stationed in the country. If these troops were to be withdrawn at some future ate, East Germany's own security forces would be prepared to assume full responsibility for internal security.

The internal security system has broken down only once and that occurred in 1953, the year of Stalin's death. At that time 300,000 workers (5% of the work force) went on strike in protest against increased work norms. The demonstrations turned into full-fledged riots directed against the government and were finally brought under control by Soviet troops. The uprising did not provide a severe test for the security forces, however, because of the reluctance of the SED leadership and Soviet military commanders to order the use of extreme measures against the rioters. By underestimating the seriousness of the situation and failing to appreciate the depth and magnitude of the workers' disaffection, East German and Soviet authorities apparently avoided more serious bloodshed. However, by the time order had been restored, 21 rioters had lost their lives.

Despite widespread discontent during the remainder of the decade, there was no repetition of the 1953 disorders. The building of the Berlin Wall in 1961 made the job of the security forces easier by facilitating control of border traffic. There were small-scale student riots in the mid-sixties as well as open criticism of the invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968, but the security forces had no difficult containing these overt expressions of dissatisfaction.

After almost a quarter of a century, most East Germans have come to terms with the Communist regime and accept the reality of Communist rule for the foreseeable future. The trend towards accommodation between the ruled and the rulers which has been on the ascendancy in recent years, has given the regime increased confidence in its legitimacy and strengthened the faction in the party which favors securing the cooperation of the people by tactics of persuasion and reward instead of relying on the discredited policies of coercion and arbitrary rule.

G. East Berlin (U/OU)

East Berlin, described by the Communists as "the democratic sector of Berlin," is the capital of East Germany. In practice, it is treated by the Communists as the 15th district (Bezirk) of East Germany, although it has not been formally incorporated into the German Democratic Republic. Because of the symbolic character and historical associations of Berlin, the East German regime has sought to develop its half into a more attractive city than other East German population centers. It still has not achieved the vast rebuilding and broadly based prosperity so evident in West Berlin.

The evolution of Communist control in the Soviet Sector of Berlin has followed a more complex court than that in East Germany because Berlin as a whole was originally governed separately under Four-Power authority and did not form part of the Soviet Occupation Zone under the basic quadripartite agreements. Before the establishment of a Four-Power Kommandatura in July 1945, the Soviet authorities already had licensed political parties to operate throughout the city, at the same time installing Communists in key positions in Berlin's administrative system. But when the Soviet authorities moved to expand their control after the formation of the Kommandatura, the further development of city-wide political activity virtually ceased. The attempt to merge the Communist Party of Germany

34

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA-RDP01-00707R000200110019-3