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Republic suspended its relations with the GDR, and this was followed shortly by a Zambian request that the East Germans close their trade mission in Lusaka. Relations with the Sudan cooled, and the reestablishment of relations between Bonn and Cairo in 1972 was viewed critically by East German leaders. Many Asian and African states continued to turn a deaf ear to German requests to upgrade relations.

In its initial forays into Western diplomacy, Pankow has tried to project the image of a responsible and constructive participant. The East German media have expressed satisfaction that East Germany is being accepted as an "equal and sovereign" state while voting regret that acceptance had not come earlier. In their new chairs at international conferences, East German diplomats have generally concentrated on the issues at hand and have avoided polemics and chauvinistic challenges to their West German colleagues. While looking westward, the East German Government is by no means relinquishing its role as loyal supporter of bloc policies. Both as observers at the United Nations and in the preparatory Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, East German representatives have staunchly - if quietly - supported Soviet initiatives.

E. Threats to government stability (U/OU)

1. Discontent and dissidence

The erection of the Berlin Wall in August 1961 not only halted the crippling exodus of trained manpower from the German Democratic Republic, but it also set in motion a slow and subtle process whereby the East Germans' previous hostility toward the regime changed first to passive acceptance and then in a growing number to positive loyalty and a sense of a separate East German national identity. Throughout the fifties, the will to resist by segments of the population had been undermined by the regime's coercive tactics, the threat of Soviet intervention to crush any uprising, the flight of potential resistance leaders to the West, and a sense of abandonment by the West which had remained aloof during the East Berlin riots in 1953 and the erection of the Wall in 1961.

The passing of the years and the maturation of a generation born under Communist rule is a major factor in the accommodation of the population to the demands of the regime; more than 30% of all East Germans were born after the war and more than 50% have no active memory of any other system. This demographic trend is reinforced by ideological indoctrination, increased economic security and well-being, and the considerable pride of the citizenry in the accomplishments wrought by their own labor in the absence of any substantial foreign assistance. As the regime has developed a greater sense of self-confidence, the controls based on force and intimidation which were instituted in the fifties have been replaced by more institutionalized restraints stressing persuasion and reward.

The long-term process of accommodation and adaptation by the citizenry does not automatically exclude manifestations of dissatisfaction or low-ley resistance to the regime and its policies. A major irritant in the past has been the regime's insistence on the mouthing of slogans and propaganda as evidence of loyalty. Even prior to Ulbricht's departure, however, the regime had begun to deemphasize these frequently superficial demonstrations of allegiance to the regime and to attach greater importance to professional competence.

The Berlin Wall and the development of sophisticated devices to discourage escape across the border have reduced the refugee flow to a mere trickle, but occasionally individuals, and even families, are lucky or resourceful enough to carry out escape plans successfully. These deeply dissatisfied persons appear to be a distinct minority, however, and in all probability a growing number of East Germans would not be prepared to leave their present positions, homes, and the manner of life to which they have become accustomed for the uncertainty of beginning anew in West Germany. There also appears to be growing optimism over the prospects of improving life at home, and a determination among many to remain and strive for this goal.

A main source of discontent in the past was the failure of the regime's economic policies to effect a rapid improvement in living standards. These problems were heightened by Ulbricht's unrealistic economic plans and his concentration on the development and expansion of heavy industry to the detriment of the consumer goods sectors. Under Honecker the regime has tried to increase domestic political stability by taking steps to improve the morale of the people. A package of new social measures was introduced in 1972 which aimed at improving health and welfare facilities, and the regime has also promised a greater volume of goods and variety of sources over the next 5 years.

The government has moved to deal with long-standing complaints directed at the stringent controls over travel and the restrictive cultural policies. Although it is now relatively easy for East German

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APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA-RDP01-00707R000200110019-3