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eased the movement of people and goods between the Federal Republic and West Berlin, and two others between the GDR and the West Berlin city government liberalized the rules for travel by West Berliners between West Berlin and East Germany and prepared the way for the elimination of enclaves within Berlin itself through territorial exchanges.

On balance, the treaties and agreements of 1970-1972 required decisive shifts in the regime's posture on the all-important question of its relations with the Federal Republic and West Berlin. Perhaps because of a pragmatic reassessment of East German interests, or because of Soviet pressure - or a combination of bot - the Honecker regime was forced to retreat from a number of long-held positions, in particular that West Berlin was part of East Germany, and that East Germany controlled access routes to the city.

e. Relations with the non-Communist world

Since 1969 the GDR has made significant progress toward achieving international recognition and the prospects are good that in the next several years this pattern will continue. General recognition has long been the goal of the East Germans. They have wanted it both as a manifestation of the regime's legitimacy and as an entree to Western markets and technology. Because of its pivotal position in the East-West power struggle, however, East Germany accepted the need to subordinate its aspirations to those of the Soviet Union and, and relations with the West were held in abeyance. It fell to Erich Honecker, as the Soviet interest in detente grew, to oversee a dramatic turnabout in Pankow's attitude toward the West.

The signing of the inter-German political treaty on 21 December 1972 opened the door to East Germany's acceptance in the West. Most Western powers, including France and the United Kingdom, have recognized Pankow, and the remainder are very likely to follow suit. East Germany has taken its seat in several international forums, such as the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, and can look forward to full UN membership by fall 1973.

As the GDR prepares for full diplomatic relations with the West, it must make a number of delicate measurements. The speed with which it moves will depend in part on the disposition of the regime's slender diplomatic resources. It must balance the benefits it finds in Western markets and in its new feeling of legitimacy against some real difficulties. It must take care not to get out in front of the Soviets, and above all it must weigh the impact of closer contact with the West on the East German people and on its own ability to build a Socialist Germanic state that is the true equal of West Germany.

Some of the nation's most talented individuals are employed in the foreign service. Many of them are tireless in their efforts to enhance East Germany's position in the countries to which they are posted. In Burma, for example, the East German consulate negotiates government-to-government trade and aid agreements and cultural exchanges. East German consular officers have regular access to the Burmese Foreign Ministry and are allowed to disseminate information and propaganda on the same scale as an embassy.

For nearly two decades East Germany struggled to gain diplomatic recognition from non-Communist countries, and it finally achieved a breakthrough in May 1969 when Iraq agreed to exchange diplomatic missions. Recognition from several other Middle Eastern, African, and Asian countries followed in quick succession. The most important of these was the United Arab Republic (Egypt), which recognized Pankow in July.

East Germany maintains a high level of official representation in Egypt, with an embassy at Cairo and a consulate in Alexandria. Communist support of the Arabs against Israel and the increased Soviet military presence in the Mediterranean probably contributed to the decision by Egypt to recognize East Germany. Furthermore, Bonn's reluctance to take retaliatory measures - other than to withdraw its ambassadors - when Cambodia and Southern Yemen had earlier recognized East Germany may have encouraged the Egyptians to act. Cairo was also well aware that the West German Government was divided at that time on the question of invoking the so-called Hallstein Doctrine under which Bonn refused to maintain diplomatic relations with countries recognizing East Germany, and neither of the governing parties wished to make it an issue in an election year.

East Germany's successful wooing of Iraq came 4 years after the Arab nations had severed relations with West Germany over the latter's recognition of Israel in 1965. Although West Germany continued to conduct extensive economic relations with a number of Arab states, its ties with Iraq had not been significant. Indeed, Iraq had little to lose and, from an economic point of view, much to gain by yielding to the strong East German pressure for recognition. Syria and Sudan, which recognized the GDR in June 1969, were similar cases in point.

East Germany has also suffered some sharp setbacks in its drive to establish diplomatic relations with non-Communist countries. In 1971 the Central African

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