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agreed on in subsequent negotiations. It became evident at a fairly early stage in the talks that basic disagreements had arisen because of Bonn's insistence that a measure of recognition be granted to the existence of "the German nation," and the desire of the West Germans for reaffirmation of Four-Power rights in Germany as a whole. The GDR categorically rejected "the German nation" concept and preferred to downplay Allied rights in all of Germany.

After much tough bargaining the two governments initialed a general political treaty in early November 1971 and signed it a month later. The treaty contained only an indirect reference to the "national question." It called for further agreements on cooperation in such fields as commerce, science and technology, transport, health, and sport. The two sides agreed on the inviolability of borders, to refrain from the use or threat of force, to respect each other's independence and autonomy, and to exchange permanent representatives.

d. Relations with Berlin

For almost two decades after the end of the Second World War the Berlin issue was the focus of controversy and tension in East-West relations. Despite the establishment in 1949 of the German Democratic Republic with its capital in East Berlin, the Soviet Union retained tight control over problems concerning Berlin because of its own awareness of the potential for conflict that existed in the tug go war over the rights of the occupying powers in the city. By the early sixties the Soviets began to allow the East German regime greater freedom of movement on some issues affecting Berlin, apparently in response to pressures by the Ulbricht regime. The regime hoped a more active Berlin policy would enable East Germany to carve out for itself a more important role in determining the future of both East and West Berlin. During most of the mid and late sixties the East Germans - undoubtedly at Soviet behest - were careful to avoid serious threats to Allied rights in West Berlin and concentrated instead on disrupting West German ties with the city. Following the student rioting in West Berlin in April 1968, which was triggered by the attempted assassination of firebrand leftist leader Rudi Dutschke, the East Germans arbitrarily barred travel through East Germany to members of West Germany's right-wing National Democratic Party, as well as to high-ranking Bonn officials, This was followed in the summer by the imposition of passport and visa requirements for West German travelers, and visa and personal identity card requirements for West Berliners visiting or transiting East Germany. The Soviets supported East German actions of this kind as long as they did not run counter to Soviet policy and did not involve the risk of a confrontation with the Western Allies.

The Ulbricht regime apparently had considerable freedom of action in its dealings with the West Berlin city administration (Senat), particularly in negotiating the several pass agreements which were concluded from 1963 to 1966. In their relations with the West Berlin authorities, the East Germans were interested mainly in encouraging the Senat to recognize the GDR, at least on a de facto basis. Although differences occasionally developed between West Berlin and Bonn authorities over the proper response to harassment of access to the city, the East Germans generally failed in their efforts to create dissension between the city government and Bonn.

In June 1972 the foreign ministers of the United Kingdom, France, and the Soviet Union, and the US Secretary of State successfully concluded nearly 2 years of negotiations by signing the Four-Power treaty on Berlin. In the agreement the Soviet Union formally agreed - for the first time since the partitioning of Germany - to share responsibility for the expeditious handling of traffic and communications into and out of West Berlin. In practical terms, the USSR's assumption of this responsibility was a blow to the East German regime which had been delegated control over the access routes by the Soviets in 1955. The Soviet Union's decision to negotiate the agreement underscored Moscow's interest in reaching detente with the West and in paving the way for the ratification by the Bundestag of the Soviet-West German treaty of August 1970 renouncing the use of force. The Western Allies had specified to the Soviet Union the ratification by the Bonn parliament was dependent upon an agreement on Berlin.

In the agreement the Soviet Union recognized the original rights of the three Western powers to maintain their presence in West Berlin, which it had often denied. Moscow also accepted a wide range of political, economic, and social ties between Bonn and West Berlin, thus retreating from its earlier position that West Berlin was an "independent political entity." In addition, the Federal Republic was authorized to represent West Berlin's interests abroad, except in those matters affecting the security or status of the city.

The successful conclusion of the Soviet-West German treaty and the Four-Power treaty on Berlin opened the door to talks between East and West Germany which led to three agreements affecting West Berlin and its ties to the West. One agreement

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