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 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA-RDP01-00707R000200110019-3

These policies are reflected in all the relevant media and are given further discrimination by political, educational, social, recreational, and professional organizations.

Although the points of emphasis in the propaganda disseminated by the regime vary from day to day to reflect the current party line, the general thrust of East German propaganda has remained consistent throughout the years. The major themes relate to the achievements of the regime and Communist nations elsewhere in the struggle to assure peace, progress, and prosperity for all people.

The art of winning support through persuasion has taken on new importance under Honecker who has stated that "the art of leadership is the art of persuasion." The party has been prodded to get to know the workers and to speak their language. Several themes have been repeatedly emphasized, particularly the central role of the Five Year plans and the obligation of each citizen to participate in strengthening socialism. By attempting to show citizens that they have an opportunity for "true" participation in the governmental process, as opposed to the "sham" participation in the West, the regime is waging a battle for the loyalty of East Germans. The old slogan, "Plane mit, arbeite mit, regiere mit" (plan with us, work with us, govern with us), expresses the Marxist-Leninist view that the dictatorship of the proletariat brings real democracy for the first time in human history to the great majority of the population.

The degree of success enjoyed by the regime in its drive to establish the legitimacy of the SED as the nation's leading force is difficult to determine. There undoubtedly is discontent and there are some who reject the concept of an East German state with the SED as its ruler, but these numbers are declining. Since the building of the Berlin Wall in 1961 there has been a slow, rather subtle, process of enforced reconciliation between the population and the regime which seems fairly well advanced. As long as the regime is able to continue to register impressive gains in economic growth and in satisfying popular demands for goods and services, growing numbers of East Germans are likely to identify their own interests with those of the regime, thereby hardening the division of Germany and establishing the legitimacy of the GDR.

Although the regime proclaims the primary mission of its well-organized and well-equipped armed forces to be the defense of East German territory against foreign enemies, an equally important task is their supporting role in maintaining internal security and order. The primary duty of the Frontier Command troops, for example, is to prevent escape from East Germany into West Germany and West Berlin.

Civilian authority over the military, exercised by regime leaders, is virtually complete. There is no conflict between military and civilian leaders, and there is no indication that the East German military is prepared to assume a role that would challenge the primacy of the party's civilian leadership.

2. Foreign

The major foreign policy objective of East Germany is to secure international acceptance and formal recognition as a sovereign state. A corollary of this policy is the intensification of the drive - initiated under Ulbricht - for systematic differentiation (Abgrenzung) of the two Germanies on the basis of their social and political orders and their alleged contributions to peace and stability in Europe. The regime has established contacts and relations with a growing number of states since the fall of 1972. Evidence of increased acceptance and recognition abroad will strengthen the position of the East German leaders with their own people by dispelling the notion of the transitory nature of the GDR and placing the final seal on the existence of two separate German states.

East Germany's dependence on the Soviet Union as the guarantor of its continues existence as a national state and the integration of its armed forces into the Warsaw Pact combined command are effective deterrents to the formulation and implementation of a defense policy inimical to the interest of Moscow and the nations of Eastern Europe. In the event of war, strategy would be dictated by Soviet leaders, and the employment of the armed forces would be in accordance with Soviet plans.

a. Relations with the Soviet Union

East Germany's international relations continue to be circumscribed by the fact that it must frequently subordinate its own interests to those of the USSR. The East German-Soviet tie has gradually changed, however, from the vassal-master relationship of the Stalinist period to one in which East Germany has become more like a junior partner in a joint venture.

By the early sixties the East Germans had begun to assert their own interests more vigorously; they were gradually allowed to determine their own internal affairs and were given some latitude in managing relations with West Germany and the non-aligned nations. But Moscow has retained the decisive voice

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APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA-RDP01-00707R000200110019-3