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to economic achievement as a measurement of the state's ability to compete with West Germany and of the regime's legitimacy to rule. In 1963 the Ulbricht regime adopted a sweeping program of reforms, the goal of which was to encourage efficiency by giving greater play to such factors as profitability, realistic price-cost relationships, material incentives, and increased initiatives and responsibility at the managerial level.

Ulbricht, who was considered a hard-line dogmatist on many questions, was instrumental in bringing in young, technically trained experts to responsible party and governmental positions. Practical economic problems came to dominate party meetings and Ulbricht personally sponsored the development of theoretical economics and encouraged the development of a computer industry. In fact, Ulbricht's fall may be partially traced to his economic theories which tended to look to the 1980s rather than coming to grips with the immediate problems facing the regime. The Polish riots of December 1970 were seen by some East German leaders as an example of what could happen when concrete daily needs were ignored in favor of long-term goals.

Since May 1971, when Honecker replaced Ulbricht, the SED has tried to strengthen domestic stability and improve the morale of the people by devoting more resources to the long-neglected consumer goods industries. In addition, Honecker announced at the fifth Central Committee plenum in April 1972 that the regime intended to expand the existing social welfare programs in order to provide additional care and services for the people.

It cannot be assumed that the promise of a greater volume of consumer goods and various services will automatically be translated into greater acceptance of the regime by the population. The comprehensive social welfare system, for example, reorganized and further developed by the regime, provides the people with a greater degree of security, particularly with respect to the healthcare field. These benefits have won the regime few converts, however, perhaps in large part because they are not innovations for Germans who have a long tradition of comprehensive social and health insurance programs that go back to the Bismarckian era in the late 19th century.

The SED leadership has at times been willing to attempt to win popular support by easing restrictions on travel and cultural activities. These concessions in the past have not always led to positive results from the regime's point of view, and such gestures as allowing greater freedom of expression to writers and artists, agreeing to pensioners' visits to West Germany, negotiating the Berlin pass agreements, and encouraging contacts with the non-Communist world were regarded as counterproductive by the leadership. After a rash of youth riots in 1965, the SED leaders again tightened controls and were reluctant to experiment further with "liberalization."

As the Dubcek reforms swept neighboring Czechoslovakia in 1968, the East German regime placed even more emphasis on strengthening the SED's commitment to orthodox Marxism-Leninism. The regime began to pay more attention to paramilitary training of students and intensified the indoctrination of youth groups in the party and mass organizations. During the first weeks following the Warsaw Pact occupation of Czechoslovakia in the fall of 1968, most military and paramilitary units in East Germany were either activated or placed on alert. Popular support for the East German role in the suppression of the Czechoslovak experiment was far from general, and the regime sought to neutralize pro-Dubcek sentiment at home by involving as many citizens as possible in military activity. There was evidence that anti-regime sentiment was prevalent among intellectuals, and there were scattered reports of wavering among military personnel, government workers, and even party members. The dissent that did surface was not widespread or well organized, and the regime quickly and quietly suppressed the sporadic student demonstrations which occurred in a number of cities.

Soon after assuming power, the Honecker leadership took tentative steps to relax some of the more onerous restrictions on cultural expression. At the Eighth Party Congress in June 1971 Honecker exhorted the artists' unions to conduct "frank, businesslike and creative discussions." Later that year at a Central Committee plenum, Honecker declared that there should be no taboos in art or literature either with regard to content or style, but he went on to warn against "feeding on the modernism of a world which is alien and even hostile to us." During 1972, the Honecker regime appeared to be in the process of determining the guidelines for its cultural policies, but it was far from certain that the first tentative steps taken by the regime represented a real change in policy rather than being merely tactical concessions.

The Honecker leadership, like its predecessor, attaches great importance to indoctrination of the population as a means of winning popular support and approval. The SED controls all media of mass communications, and party officials responsible for propaganda and ideology together with other top levels formulate the main lines of doctrinal policy.

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