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continued to emphasize the necessity of solving economic problems, and gave lower priority to broader political and ideological issues. Several high-level party members later criticized this development, pointing out that ideological work had partially faded into the background because of the preoccupation with economic problems, and that party meetings had often taken on the nature of "production discussions."

The regime's overriding interest in economic theory and development fluctuated, as various officials expressed concern that the role of the party and indoctrination in Marxism-Leninism were being neglected. At the Seventh Congress of the SED in April 1967 Ulbricht expounded his concept of "the developed social system of socialism" which, as later amplified, implied that socialism as it existed in the German Democratic Republic was a distinct and independent social order and was not merely a stepping stone to communism. He portrayed the GDR as a model to be followed, thus deemphasizing the Soviet example and experience. Furthermore, Ulbricht began increasingly to stress national themes, and at times appeared to be devoting scant attention to the interests of international communism as defined by the Soviet Communist Party.

Ulbricht's fascination with science and abstract economic theory were not shared by all, however. In April 1969, with Czechoslovak developments still being sharply debated and ideological factionalism at an all-time high within the Communist world, Politburo member Honecker told the 10th plenum of the Central Committee that party discipline was as important as economic development. He castigated supporters of the "convergence theory," (i.e. that capitalism and communism were coming more and more to resemble each other), as well as reformers and revisionists, and hinted that his remarks were intended as much for domestic consumption as for known mavericks such as Czechoslovakia and Romania. Emphasis on pre-military training for youth through intensified programs sponsored by the Society for Sport and Technology (GST), the Free German Youth (FDJ), and Ernst Thalmann Pioneers, along with increased party indoctrination, coincided with the government's increasing concern over ideological deviation and home and abroad.

Leading party ideologist Kurt Hager supported Honecker by stressing the importance of planning and the party's role in directing ideology and cultural development. Hager justified the SED's domination of intellectual activity by terming the party the most important force behind social development.

For some time there had been rumors of impending changes in the top party leadership, but the rank and file were taken by surprise when Ulbricht stepped down in May 1971 as First Secretary in favor of Erich Honecker. While there was no doubt that age and ill health had begun to take its tool - Ulbricht was 77 at the time - these factors played only a small role in the ouster; he was removed apparently because of dissatisfaction with both his internal and foreign policies. Within the top SED leadership, there was concern that the change should come before the party's Eighth Congress which was scheduled for June. Months prior to the Congress, Ulbricht and other party leaders had set the agenda which included a major ideological speech by Ulbricht on his favorite theme - "the developed social system of socialism." By allowing Ulbricht to deliver a speech on this theme, the leadership would have enabled the aging leader's views to be cemented even more firmly in the East German ideological catechism, thereby contributing to the enhancement of Ulbricht's prestige and authority. Furthermore, it would have been difficult and perhaps embarrassing for the leadership to try to effect a change in ideological emphasis at the Congress or in the period immediately after. At the Central Committee plenum in May, a new agenda for the Congress was approved which replaced Ulbricht's speech with one by Honecker. In their addresses to the party Congress, Honecker and the other speakers concentrated on economic matters of concern to the regime and totally ignored Ulbricht's theses and concepts. The final blow was delivered a few months later by Kurt Hager, a leading ideologist, who explicitly rejected Ulbricht's theses without mentioning their author by name.

Soviet leaders also had cause to be dissatisfied with Ulbricht. His continued references to "national" themes were probably irksome, but more importantly his foreign policy stratagems were creating difficulties for Moscow which was pursuing its own foreign policy goals. The Soviet Union was anxious to improve relations with West Germany, and in August 1970 the two states had concluded a treaty renouncing the use of force. The West Germans, however, maintained that final ratification of the treaty would be withheld until there was an improvement regarding the status of West Berlin. Injection of the Berlin issue into the quest for detente was a challenge to Ulbricht who had sought by every means to weaken the Western position in the divided city and had refused to make any meaningful concessions. Honecker was also known for his hard line vis-a-vis the West Germans, but he did not possess the personal authority of Ulbricht, nor was

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