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"socialism." Initially, the SED tried to gain support by stressing "democratic socialism" and German self-identity, i.e. the concept of a "German road to socialism." The continuing failure to gain widespread support from the people, however, together with the breakdown of the uneasy cooperation between the USSR and its wartime allies, led Moscow and the SED to harden their attitude and to abandon the gradualist approach.

Until 1948 the SED was not a cadre party in the Leninist sense, but a Socialist mass party of 2 million members. The expulsion of Yugoslavia from the Comintern in 1948 provided the impetus for Ulbricht and the other East German Communist leaders to transform the SED into a tightly controlled and highly disciplined organization modeled after the Soviet Communist Party. Shortly after, Ulbricht declared the SED "a party of a new type" - in other words, a Leninist party - which was to be the "self-conscious and organized vanguard of the working class." This decision meant disavowal of the concept of a "German road to socialism," recognition of a leading role of the Soviet Communist Party, and certain important organizational changes. The top leadership was solidly packed with Ulbricht's adherents from the Moscow emigration and from local Communist circles. The party membership at all levels was drastically purged, with prominent Social Democrats and those with Western contacts the first to go. New party statutes were adopted which reflected the latest Soviet Communist Party practices, and new requirements for party membership, involving a period of candidacy and intensive indoctrination, were put into effect.

The years 1949-1953 reflected the high point of East German "Stalinism." With the Ulbricht element firmly in control, the party committed itself to an economic program of accelerated communization and industrialization, and took the initial steps toward farm collectivization and emulation of the Soviet example as the only legitimate model for the party and the government. As popular resentment grew, Ulbricht again resorted to purges, culminating in the removal from office in May 1953 of the party's then second-ranking man, Franz Dahlem, for "political blindness." The purges, however, were not as brutal as those which occurred elsewhere in Eastern Europe, and this may help to explain the relative mildness of the post-Stalin reaction.

Events in the USSR caused complications in East Germany. Stalin's death and evidence of confusion and competition among his successors were reflected in conflicting directives concerning Moscow's German policy and East Germany's internal policy. Within the SED leadership, Minister for State Security Wilhelm Zaisser and party ideologist Rudolf Hermstadt called for a change in the party line and for the removal of Ulbricht. Internal problems and Soviet pressure forced the regime to retreat from the tough line it had previously taken on such matters as workers' production, quotas and the attitude towards the middle class and the churches. The attempt by certain labor unions to resort to strikes as a means of improving their standard of living led to the uprising of 17 June 1953. Although the rioting had a profound psychological impact in East Germany, only about 5% of the industrial work force actually went on strike, and the resulting clashes resulted in only 21 fatalities.

SED officials reacted "in a confused and bewildered manner," as Ulbricht later confessed. Party organizations in major cities where SPD traditions were strong joined the rioters in demands for Ulbricht's ouster. Even after Soviet troops had restored order, the party remained badly shaken.

Ulbricht - with strong Soviet backing - lost little time in moving to re-establish his authority over the party and state. Zaisser and Hermstadt were expelled from the leadership, and later from the party, on charges of forming a "party faction with defeatist aims." Other prominent SED figures were removed from their government positions, and some were tried and imprisoned for complicity in the uprising. Ulbricht also ousted "enemy elements" in the party, possible as many as 20,000 functionaries and 50,000 rank-and-file party members were purged. These measures, backed by the show of Soviet force, were sufficient to prevent any serious challenge to Ulbricht's leadership for the next 3 years.

The so-called thaw in Soviet literary and cultural policies in 1955-56 did not induce the East German regime to make meaningful concessions in its own intellectual community, with the result that many East German writers and artists - including SED members - hoped that Ulbricht might be ousted because of his identification with the Stalinist policies condemned by Khrushchev at the 20th Soviet Communist Party Congress. Ulbricht managed to hold on to his position in maneuvering the SED Central Committee into a vote of confidence, while instituting a few limited measures to purge the regime of its Stalinist past. An investigation of past illegalities was launched, which resulted in in amnesty for a large number of political prisoners. A special SED commission, established to review past purges, recommended the rehabilitation of Dahlem and other

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APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA-RDP01-00707R000200110019-3