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violation of the German-Danish mutual nonaggression pact signed in May 1939.

Supporters of disarmament and nonalignment were generally discredited as a result of Danish experiences during World War II. The invasion and occupation created a widespread resolve that such a national disaster should never be repeated. In the early postwar period sentiment was sharply divided, nonetheless, as to what goal to pursue; the Western Alliance, a Scandinavian defense alliance, or some new form of neutrality. It was soon evident that military nonalignment and reliance on the nebulous security guarantees of the United Nations was an unrealistic choice in a world then dividing into two antagonistic blocs. A Scandinavian defense system appealed emotionally to the Danes but appeared unfeasible both in the face of growing Soviet power and in light of conflicting defense policies, interests, and traditions among the potential members of such an alliance. After considerable debate, Denmark rejected both a Swedish-style neutrality and a Scandinavian defense alliance and in April 1949 entered NATO along with Norway. The motion to join NATO carried by an overwhelming 119 to 23 votes, with the Social Democrats, Moderate Liberals, and Conservatives in support, the Justice Party split, and the Communists and Radical Liberals in opposition. Eventually the Radical Liberals softened their anti-NATO stand, but their immediate defection from the traditional governing alliance with the Social Democratic Party cost the latter control of the government from 1950 to 1953.

Even after their entry into NATO, the Danes continued to be strongly influenced by their earlier traditions, and they have remained less than fully committed to the alliance either in attitude or in terms of financial support and troop commitments. A series of political compromises over the years, particularly between the Social Democrats and their pacifist allies on the left, prevented the military establishment from reaching the status of an adequate national defense force. Not only did the military services fail to meet the NATO force goals, but they even fell short of the national goals set down in the Defense Act of 1960, which in turn had been reduced from the goals set forth in defense legislation of 1950-1951. Over the years the terms of military service were periodically reduced, so that in 1973 conscription time was set at only 9 months.

As indicated by the thinness of the military forces at hand, the Danes have lacked the political will to finance an adequate defense establishment. Expenditures for the military sector have traditionally been much less popular than outlays for the social sector, and as the threat of attack from the East has seemingly waned, so has the inclination of political leaders to risk public disfavor by bolstering the defense budget.

Nevertheless, the agreement reached in February 1973 among the four strongest political parties, the SDP, the Conservatives, the MLP, and the RLP - together controlling 90% of the Folketing seats, represents some braking of the downward slide in NATO commitment. It provides over a 4-year period for a 6% increase in real terms for the defense budget. Although conscription time was reduced, overall force levels were cut far less than had been feared. - falling just slightly short of Danish Defense Command proposals - in all three services. And the agreement contains, through the newly created Defense Review Committee, a guarantee against further cuts for the 4-year period. This committee, composed of two representatives each from the four political parties effecting the compromise, most give unanimous consent to any changes in the defense budget, enabling the strongly pro-NATO Conservatives and Moderate Liberals to exercise a veto.

Perhaps most significantly, the 1973 defense agreement, following as it does Danish accession to the EC, demonstrates a definitive West European orientation, including a total dependence on NATO for collective security. Denmark's overall NATO commitment may remain relatively weak, especially in view of treaty provisions preventing much meaningful outside bolstering: no foreign troops or nuclear weapons may be stationed in Denmark in peacetime. And the Danes themselves have been sensitive about statistics which show them expanding little more on defense, proportionally, than the other NATO laggards, Luxembourg and Iceland - particularly since the last-named nation has no armed forces. Danish officials maintain, however, that these shortcomings are offset to a considerable degree by their willingness to allow the United States to establish air bases and early-warning facilities in Greenland.

In one special area of defense preparedness, Denmark ranks very high within NATO. Only Norway has a comparable civil defense establishment, both countries, in the event of nuclear attack, having the capacity to protect in appropriately supplied shelters over 40% of their respective populations. Armed neutral Sweden, with the most developed civil defense system in the world, has apparently set the pace for its two Nordic NATO members. All three countries possess early warning systems and a network of shelters and support facilities exceeding by far anything attempted outside the Scandinavian area. In 1971, when Denmark had a total population of 4.9 million persons, there were over 2 million shelter

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APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA-RDP01-00707R000200110016-6