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'''FIGURE 6. The Katarinaberget bomb shelter in Stockholm can hold 17,000 people. Used as a garage, it has also a drive-in bank and a gasoline station. (U/OU)''' (picture)

East and West has caused an increasing number of Swedes to believe that the Soviet threat has diminished. The growing radicalization of Swedish youth has caused the government to modify its former cool attitude toward the Soviet Union. At present this trend does not appear to present a threat to democratic institutions in Sweden.

2. Communism

The Party of the Left-Communist is the only well-organized group with any potential for undermining the security of the state. However, its strength in the Riksdag is far below the level that would afford the party even a remote chance of gaining a formalized voice in government councils. Furthermore, its extralegal subversive potential tends to be neutralized by the awareness of the government, organized labor, and most of the general public to the tactics and objectives of the Communists. The popular support enjoyed by the Communists dropped drastically after World War II, and the party still attempts to persuade the electorate that it is not a tool of Soviet interests and that it is a bona fide Swedish political party committed to change through legal political processes. For a discussion of the overt role of the party see above, under Political Dynamics.

The party has always placed highest priority on attempting to infiltrate organized labor in order to be able to disrupt the economy and weaken the strong ties between labor and the Social Democratic Party. National, provincial, and local governments are relatively free of Communist infiltration. A considerable number of Communists have entered the civil service, from which they are not excluded, but there is no evidence that they have attained higher level positions. Although the party has representatives in the Riksdag, they have been denied access to classified information relating to national defense and foreign policy on the grounds that their political loyalties are suspect and that it would be inappropriate to disclose information affecting Sweden's security to members of a subversive organization. By concerted action of the non-Communist parties, the Communists have been denied membership on parliamentary committees dealing with sensitive subjects; when foreign policy is debated in the Riksdag classified information is not made available to Communist representatives. Tight security practice is believes to have kept Communist infiltration within the defense establishment to a relatively low level. Communists entering the armed services through the draft are placed in non-sensitive posts, and known party members are barred from officer training. Background investigations for employees of the defense establishment and in other sensitive areas are conducted by the police in cooperation with the counterintelligence arm of the

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APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA-RDP01-00707R000200090019-6