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non-members alike. The division of Scandinavia between members of NATO and neutral nations has handicapped to some extent Sweden's policy of expanding the traditionally close ties which have existed among them. While Danish and Norwegian membership in NATO precludes close cooperation in the political and defense fields, this has been offset to some degree by the wide range of common policies pursued by these countries in the economic, social, and cultural fields. This cooperation has been expanded to include, for example, common membership in the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) and the Nordic Council, free movement of Scandinavian nationals within the area, and the trend towards reciprocity and harmonization of policies covering a wide range of activities, particularly in the labor and social welfare fields. Aside from the value of promoting close ties among the Scandinavian countries, the Swedish Government considers that these ties have great significance, because they enable Finland to strengthen its connections westward in a manner least likely to arouse Soviet suspicion and opposition. In line with the high priority Sweden places on maintaining an independent Finland on its frontiers, Swedish statemen believe that the nation's policy of neutrality and non-alliance affords it some leverage in alleviating some Soviet pressures on Finland.

Next to its Scandinavian ties, Sweden attaches greatest importance to membership in the United Nations, which it joined in 1946. A staunch supporter of the United Nations, Sweden provided the organization with its second secretary-general, the late Dag Hammarskjold, and is an active participant in a wide range of the organization's activities. It is a strong supporter of the UN peacekeeping activities and has provided troops for this purpose in Cyprus, the Middle East, and the Congo. Sweden has sought to provide responsible leadership for the smaller non-nuclear states by seeking ways to persuade the major powers to take meaningful steps toward disarmament. The problems of the former colonial areas are followed with great interest, and Sweden has been a strong advocate of aid and assistance to the less developed countries. The government takes the position that the United Nations should administer aid programs and favors the eventual termination of bilateral assistance agreements. Sweden supports the principal of universal membership in the world organization. On questions involving the former colonial areas, it has frequently sided with the Afro-Asian nations. Although occasionally at odds with the United States on a number of issues facing the United Nations, Sweden usually has sought to play a useful, humanitarian role to the world body.

Sweden has been a strong supporter of several non-military regional organizations and has viewed membership in them as consistent with its policy of non-alliance. Stockholm maintains close relations with its Nordic neighbors, with which is cooperates in a wide range of economic, social, and cultural problems. Most joint enterprises have been conducted under the auspices of the Nordic Council, which Sweden helped to found in 1952. Sweden is also a member of the Council of Europe and maintains missions to the EC and the European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM) in Brussels, and to the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) in Luxembourg. Sweden was a charter member of the Organization for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC) and remains a member of its successor, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). In addition, Sweden is a member of some 20 other international organizations dealing with trade, transportation, communications, energy, finance, science and health.

The creation of the Common Market in 1957 and its subsequent development have necessitated major revisions in traditional Swedish trade policies. Swedish leaders have tended to view the EC with suspicion, fearing that its policies would be discriminatory and harmful to commercial interests, and that it would eventually divide Europe into two competing trade blocs. The EC also presents a difficult political choice: Sweden must weigh the economic importance of retaining access to the large markets of the recently expanded organization against the possibility that closer ties to the EC would require Sweden to accept certain elements of the Rome Treaty that would compromise its traditional neutrality. Sweden was able to offset some of the economic impact of the EC by joining EFTA in 1960, but the outlook for that organization is uncertain in view of the decision in 1972 of three of its members - Denmark, Ireland, and the United Kingdom - to join the EC. More than Sweden's imports and exports are subject to EC tariffs as a result, and unless the Riksdag ratifies the free trade agreement with Brussels, the Swedish economy will suffer. One alternative that has been considered is to revive the Nordic Economic Union (NORDEK) concept.

A major preoccupation of Swedish foreign policy is the maintenance of good relations with the Soviet Union, but this goal has tended to be elusive because

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