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gradual reduction in the size of the ground forces. At the same time, however, large, military-type security forces were maintained for use in eradicating armed underground organizations. By 1949 the underground had been eliminated, and a swift 50% reduction in the strength of the militarized security forces followed; by 1958 their strength had diminished to 45,000, the level that still prevails. In 1950, in reaction to the eruption of hostilities in Korea, the ground forces were expanded again and nearly doubled in that year. They reached the post-World War II peace in the winter of 1951-1952. Restoration of a more normal peacetime strength was effected in 1952. Since 1953, the ground forces strength has stabilized at between 200,000 and 250,000; in 1973 it was 210,000. The naval and air forces have been built up since 1946. In 1950 the strengths of these two services were about 7,000 men each. The naval forces have increased to about 26,000 since then. The air forces strength is now about 55,000.

3. Training (S)

Training in the armed forces is rigorous, effective, and realistic, and is modeled after that of the Soviet forces. The Main Inspector of Training is responsible for the development of tactics, provides a program of training for all units down to regimental level, conducts maneuvers and field tests, and inspects the combat and specialized training in the ground, naval, and air forces. In addition, this inspectorate maintains liaison with the Warsaw Pact combined command, through which it also receives general policies pertaining to troop training and exercises.

The combat training program is implemented by the three military districts and the naval and air forces. The program includes large-scale exercises in the autumn season involving ground, naval, and air forces.

Branch schools for officers, officer candidates, and specialists are established and supported by the services and arms under the director of the Main Inspector of Training. The major Ministry of National Defense schools are the General Staff Academy (at Rembertow, near Warsaw) and the Military Technical Academy (at Warsaw), both under the supervision of the Chief of General Staff, and the Military Political Academy (at Warsaw) under the supervision of the Main Political Directorate. Selected Polish officers and enlisted men are sent to technical and higher military schools in the Soviet Union. For training, the Poles have also used Soviet missile and aircraft ranges.

4. Military budget (C)

The military budget is prepared by the Ministry of National Defense in conformity with expenditure guidelines provided by the State Planning Commission. A draft is submitted to the Ministry of Finance for analysis and inclusion in the state budget. The state budget is then presented to the Council of Ministers and Sejm (parliament) for approval.

The announced defense budget, which reflects the general level of defense spending, is probably not all-inclusive because some military-related expenditures are likely to be listed under other categories of the national budgets. Military outlays increased at an average rate of about 7% between 1968 and 1972, but planned expenditures declined in 1973. As a share of GNP, defense spending increased from about 3.9% to about 4.3% between 1968. and 1972. The increased expenditures are probably a reflection of the costs incurred by replacing outmoded equipment and by introducing new and more sophisticated weapons systems. Another factor contributory to the increase is that domestically manufactured materiel is now priced at levels which more closely correspond to the actual costs of production.

5. Logistics (S)

Poland has the industrial capability to provide substantial support for its armed forces. Producing a relatively large quantity and wide range of products, the industrial sector has expanded considerably in recent years. Industry, however, is dependent upon imports for many strategic raw materials. Facilities for producing military equipment are modern and well equipped, but current output is substantially below peak levels because Poland has found it more practical and economical to acquire materiel from the USSR.

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APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA-RDP01-00707R000200070031-4