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APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA-RDP01-00707R000200070030-5 {| class="commodity-table" !| !colspan=4 scope="col"| Communist Countries !colspan=4 scope="col"| Non-Communist Countries !colspan=2 scope="col"| Of Which: Industrial West !scope="col"| !scope="col"| 1960 !scope="col"| 1965 !scope="col"| 1970 !scope="col"| 1971 !scope="col"| 1960 !scope="col"| 1965 !scope="col"| 1970 !scope="col"| 1971 !scope="col"| 1970 !scope="col"| 1971 !scope="col"| Imports !scope="row"| Machinery and equipment !scope="row"| Raw materials and semimanufactures !scope="col"| Of which: !scope="row"| Metallurgical industry products !scope="row"| Chemical industry products !scope="row"| Light industry products !scope="row"| Foodstuffs !scope="row"| Agricultural products !scope="row"| Total !scope="col"| Exports !scope="row"| Machinery and equipment !scope="row"| Raw materials and semimanufactures !scope="col"| Of which: !scope="row"| Metallurgical industry products !scope="row"| Fuels and power !scope="row"| Light industry products !scope="row"| Foodstuffs !scope="row"| Agricultural products !scope="row"| Total
 * + FIGURE 24. Commodity structure of foreign trade (U/OU) (Percent of total value)
 * 34.4 || 45.2 || 46.2 || 43.7 || 20.4 || 16.2 || 23.7 || 25.8 || 28.8 || 30.7
 * 38.8 || 38.1 || 41.9 || 40.0 || 34.9 || 38.6 || 42.8 || 42.0 || 46.4 || 45.4
 * - class="offset1"
 * - class="offset2"
 * (16.8) || (15.1) || (19.0) || (17.2) || (14.6) || (15.0) || (14.9) || (14.9) || (17.5) || (17.1)
 * - class="offset2"
 * (7.1) || (7.2) || (7.7) || (7.5) || (13.7) || (15.7) || (17.3) || (18.1) || (18.0) || (19.6)
 * 10.7 || 7.8 || 6.0 || 6.0 || 17.9 || 12.6 || 10.9 || 9.1 || 7.0 || 5.4
 * 7.8 || 4.9 || 2.8 || 3.7 || 9.9 || 10.2 || 11.5 || 13.1 || 8.7 || 11.6
 * 8.3 || 4.0 || 4.1 || 6.6 || 16.9 || 22.4 || 11.1 || 10.0 || 9.1 || 6.9
 * - class="offset1 total"
 * 100.0 || 100.0 || 100.0 || 100.0 || 100.0 || 100.0 || 100.0 || 100.0 || 100.0 || 100.0
 * 41.3 || 51.2 || 56.4 || 55.4 || 11.0 || 12.4 || 15.6 || 20.1 || 6.8 || 11.7
 * 45.2 || 35.9 || 29.4 || 30.2 || 39.7 || 37.5 || 46.0 || 45.8 || 49.7 || 48.8
 * - class="offset1"
 * - class="offset2"
 * (12.6) || (8.3) || (7.4) || (6.4) || (6.3) || (5.9) || (12.9) || (10.9) || (12.7) || (11.1)
 * - class="offset2"
 * (25.8) || (18.7) || (11.0) || (11.9) || (17.4) || (11.6) || (15.1) || (17.6) || (18.5) || (20.8)
 * 7.5 || 6.6 || 9.4 || 10.4 || 6.4 || 7.9 || 6.8 || 6.7 || 6.2 || 6.4
 * 4.6 || 4.6 || 2.2 || 2.9 || 35.5 || 33.0 || 23.3 || 20.0 || 27.2 || 23.3
 * 1.4 || 1.7 || 2.6 || 1.1 || 7.4 || 9.2 || 8.3 || 7.4 || 10.1 || 9.3
 * - class="offset1 total"
 * 100.0 || 100.0 || 100.0 || 100.0 || 100.0 || 100.0 || 100.0 || 100.0 || 100.0 || 100.0
 * }

U.S.S.R., in giving Poland a cautious approval to seek technological assistance and material aid in the form of capital goods from the West, clearly recognizes the employment dilemma in the years immediately ahead. Polish planners anticipate the need to create 1.8 million new jobs during 1971–75—more than during any other period since the mid-1950's. Without adequate supplies of raw materials and the vast Soviet market for the output of its expanding industry, an industrial slowdown and consequent unemployment could easily result and pose a potential threat to the stability of the Gierek Regime. Past massive investments in its own extractive industries—especially coal, copper, sulfur, and zinc—and an unremitting commitment to self-sufficiency in grain, also have enhanced Poland's image in Soviet eyes. Evidence of Soviet willingness to continue the present relationship may have been indicated by an announced commitment to supply 11 million tons of crude oil in 1975—about a three-fifths increase above Poland's 1970 imports. The larger imports are required to supply the anticipated rapid expansion of the petrochemical industry and the increased requirements for transportation.

3. Economic relations with the West (C)

a. Background

Since the mid-1950's, Polish leaders have sought vigorously to obtain trade, credit, and market concessions from many non-Communist countries, especially in Western Europe. Poland has been the largest recipient of Western credits and the only one in Communist Eastern Europe to draw on P.L. 480 credits. The country's indebtedness to the West reached an estimated $1.6 billion by the end of 1972. Nevertheless, Poland's relatively low debt-service ratio and good prospects for economic growth make it the best credit risk in Eastern Europe.

The relatively large share of the West in Poland's foreign trade is due largely to the fact that about 90% of Poland's prewar trade was with Western countries, and Poland did not need to reorient its trade to the Communist circle to the same extent as the other East European Communist countries. Unlike most of those countries, Poland had large quantities of fuels and raw materials, particularly coal, that were marketable in the West as well as in the Communist countries.

Trade arrangements have been spelled out in some detail in recent long-term trade agreements with

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APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA-RDP01-00707R000200070030-5