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subsidized food products. By the end of 1970, excessive demands for meat and other agricultural products seemed to make such action necessary.

When Gierek gained power after the riots, he scrapped the incentives system (except for experiments earlier under way in selected enterprises) and eventually rescinded the food price increases. In 1972 the regime came up with a new program for improving the system of planning and management, which gave greater responsibility to the enterprises and also strengthened central controls. In 1973, 35 Polish industrial enterprises, associations, and combines were to begin experimentation with their planning and management systems. Among other things, these enterprises would be able to decide on the use of investments — to be financed out of their own profits or from bank loans. So far 28 large economic units and all state-owned trading organizations have begun such experimentation, and modifications are to be introduced gradually to other economic units. While realizing it's too early to evaluate results of the experiments, the Poles claim that the enterprises so far involved have attained exceptional increases in production.

5. Manpower

In addition to the high rate of capital investment, an important factor in Poland's ability to maintain high rates of industrial growth has been the existence of labor reserves that fed the expansion of industrial employment throughout most of the postwar period. In the early 1950's, Poland was able to increase its industrial labor force rapidly by transferring large numbers of workers from agriculture: between 1950 and 1955 the industrial labor force increased by an estimated 587,000 (4.7% a year), while the agricultural labor force declined by about 644,000 (Figure 20). Wholesale transfers of labor from agriculture to industry stopped after 1956, when the excess agricultural employment was eliminated and the decision of the Communist Party to retain private ownership of farming encouraged people to stay in farming. In later years, the government took more affirmative action to keep workers on the farms by strengthening monetary and educational incentives for Polish youth, with very limited success.

In the 1960's a natural increase in the working population, more than any other factor, enabled the country to maintain a high rate of economic growth. Poland had one of the highest birth rates in Europe for a decade and a half following World War II, and roughly one-half million Polish youth have come of working age annually since 1963; most of these have found jobs outside agriculture. During 1960-72, the total labor force grew at an estimated annual average rate of 1.4% and the industrial labor force increased at a rate of 3.5%.

The pattern of employment after 1965 ran counter to the Gomulka regime's intention — expressed in advance of the 1966-70 plan — to encourage an expansion of small-scale industries requiring negligible investments and of other labor-intensive enterprises. Instead, the rapid growth of the industrial labor force occurred mainly in heavily capitalized industries — machine building, transportation equipment, metals, and chemicals. The more labor-intensive industries, such as foodstuffs, textiles, and fuels, helped somewhat in expanding employment, but at more modest rates.

The rapid expansion of the labor force has been a mixed blessing. Poland was able to increase industrial output rapidly simply by adding to its industrial labor force, and thus it did not face the need to modernize its industries and increase their efficiency with the same degree of urgency as other East European Communist countries. As a result, most of Poland's industrial plant is in urgent need of modernization and the organization of employees within plants often lacks a rational basis. Excess employment in some industries also has adversely affected labor discipline; because a Polish worker fired from one job can easily find another, the problems of absenteeism, alcoholism, and indifference on the job are common.

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