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forces under Gierek indicates a mutual trust and confidence between the regime and the internal security apparatus.

In addition to the regular, uniformed police and the secret police, both subordinate to the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the internal security forces consist of fully militarized units called the Internal Defense Forces (WOW) which, as an integrated component of the armed forces, are subordinate to the Ministry of National Defense. The WOW was created in mid-1965 as a result of the merger of the former Internal Security Corps (KBW), a highly militarized police guard, and the Border Guard (WOP), which was charged with the security of state frontiers. At the same time, the command of those merged services passed from the Ministry of Internal Affairs to the Ministry of National Defense where they became the core of an integrated system of rear area defense under the command of a vice minister. In 1972, however, the WOP was resubordianted to the Ministry of Internal Affairs.

For 10 years after the establishment of the Communist regime in 1944 the internal security apparatus concentrated on successfully combatting armed resistance by anti-Communist subversive groups and in suppressing other anti-state activity. Changes in the political climate beginning in 1954 resulted in a period of organizational flux, and a decline in the efficiency and morale of the security forces. These factors contributed materially to the political instability and outbursts of popular dissidence that accompanied the coming to power in October 1956 of the regime of Wladyslaw Gomulka.

Parallel with the consolidation of Gomulka's power, the security apparatus gradually regained much of its former preeminence through steady increases in its size, effectiveness, and morale. Nevertheless, it no longer employed the widespread former tactics of the Stalinist era. More importantly, unlike the period of the early 1950s when it often effectively usurped the party's power in many areas, the security forces were brought under effective party control.

After 1959, however, the security apparatus became increasingly dominated by the party's hardline faction which, under the leadership of security chief Mieczyslaw Moczar, advocated greater national discipline. Moczar's increasing dominance over the security forces paralleled the growth of factionalism in the party in general, and the development of increasing friction between Moczar and Gomulka in particular. This friction erupted into a full-scale party crisis in 1968, which Gomulka survived in part by reaching a compromise with the party elements represented by Moczar.

On the eve of the December 1970 workers' revolt the militarized security forces - specifically the WOW component of the armed forces - were under the command of Vice Minister of National Defense Korczynski who had long been considered a sympathizer of Moczar, but loyal to Gomulka. Despite the complexities of political allegiances involved, the fact remains that Korczynski's forces, together with the police, responded brutally to Gomulka's fateful order to suppress the workers' riots, while his immediate superior, Minister of National Defense Jaruzelski, reportedly either demurred or openly opposed such action. When the Gomulka leadership - devoid of support both at home and in the Soviet Union - collapsed of its own weight, the prescient attitude of Jaruzelski stood vindicated while Korczynski and the security forces under his command bore the brunt of public rage and Gierek's displeasure.

When Gierek took power, therefore, one of the innumerable problems he faced was how to maintain the effectiveness and morale of the security apparatus while establishing his own control over its command structure and satisfying the popular clamor for an accounting of its past excesses. Gierek's moves to solve this problem were characteristically pragmatic and in the end successful. As a first step he made known his basic decision to avoid the use of force in the future unless recourse to "all available political means" failed. To make this decision credible, the police and security apparatus kept an extremely low profile. While the restraint of the regular army units in December 1970 was highly publicized, the brutal measures against the workers by the security forces were roundly condemned; culpability for the excesses, however, was skillfully deflected from the security apparatus itself to the ousted Gomulka regime. Scapegoats were also provided, although in a relatively low-key fashion. Korczynski was unceremoniously ousted from his position and "exiled" as ambassador to Algeria where he later died. A thorough review of security practices and a purge of personnel in the upper echelons of the security apparatus in 1971 served a dual purpose: to weed out those persons with lingering loyalties to Moczar, and to change that image of the security forces so that public cooperation would be enlisted in the maintenance of law and order. The major tool in this public relations campaign has been a balanced, relatively sophisticated, and moderate approach to what might be called "police-community" relations. This approach includes projecting an image of greater contact between the

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APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA-RDP01-00707R000200070029-7