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by additional students and youth charged with sporadic protests against the invasion of Czechoslovakia that August. One group of these was tried and sentenced in October 1969 for distributing leaflets protesting Polish participation in the invasion. In February 1970 the Gomulka regime brought to trial a related and allegedly major group of young people accused of smuggling subversive material from Czechoslovakia into Poland, passing these and other materials to Polish emigre organizations in Paris, working on behalf of "foreign intelligence," and finally, of preparing a "plot" to overthrow the Polish Government. There is no evidence, however, that more than smuggling and disseminating of pro-liberal and anti-regime publications was involved in this case. The Polish regime's blatant escalation of the charges against the group, the wide propaganda exploitation of the open trial, and the relatively lenient sentences all suggested that the major function of the trial was to provide an opportunity for a propaganda barrage against alleged Western "centers of intelligence activity against Poland" and to further intimidate the Polish public.

There appeared to be a similar propaganda intent in the publicity surrounding the occasional arrest and trials of persons charged with serving Western intelligence organizations. These alleged spies was never said to operate as part of a widespread network, nor was it said that they were members of an underground organization. The press unusually stressed their individual recruitment, deliberately leaving the impression that material gain and not anti-Communist sentiment was the main motive for espionage. These cases invariably were used to underscore other official propaganda designed to increase popular "vigilance" against Western intelligence efforts in the country.

Since the Gierek regime came to power in December 1970, the party's and the government's more open style of rule, encouragement of "constructive dissent" by the people, and the eased political and social climate in the country have further reduced the potential for subversive activity. More simply, the Gierek regime's willingness to provide legitimate political and social channels for the controlled articulation of dissent has reduced the need of its critics to organize clandestinely.

At the same time, however, the new leadership has made it abundantly clear that it remains just as intolerant and just as watchful of activity aimed at the primacy of the party, the Communist system, or Poland's alliance with the Soviet Union as was its predecessor. Moreover, the regime's clear willingness to continue taking its lead from Moscow in terms of bloc-wide campaigns against "ideological penetration" by the West has been demonstrated. This has been especially true with regard to the Soviet campaign for vigilance that has paralleled the momentum toward detente in Europe. While Polish official echoes of this campaign have been weak and pro forma compared with Moscow's exhortations, few Poles doubt that a full-scale "vigilance" campaign could be mounted at any time in conformity with Soviet desiderata.

The danger of subversion from elements favoring the Chinese Communist ideological position has always been minimal both within the Polish party and among the people in general. In early 1966, however, China - working through its sole European ally, Albania - initiated a propaganda campaign designed to exploit the sentiments of the remnants of Gomulka's Stalinist opponents. This campaign was facilitated by the defection in February 1966 of formerly prominent Polish Stalinist Kazimierz Mijal to Albana. Since that year, Mijal's activities have centered on anti-Gomulka (later anti-Gierek) and anti-Soviet broadcasts beamed to Poland by Radio Tirana. These broadcasts generally attack the "revisionist, neo-capitalist clique" that has allegedly ruled Poland since 1956, making apparently no distinction in its value judgements between Gomulka and his successor. In early 1966, Mijal also extolled the alleged formation in Poland of a so-called "Provisional Central Committee of the Polish Communist Party" and of numerous "cells" of its pro-Chinese Communist adherents.

Although Mijal's activities were evidently designed at most to cause embarrassment for the Polish regime, Gomulka demonstrated little serious concern over the impact of this propaganda and Gierek has shown none. The new Polish leadership is probably aware that, while receptiveness to criticism of some of its policies remains, the essentially Stalinist remedies advocated by Mijal are unlikely to find fruitful ground among the population. In the late 1960s some pro-Chinese, anti-Gomulka and anti-Soviet printed propaganda reportedly was disseminated in Poland - probably through the Chinese and Albanian embassies in Warsaw - but there is no evidence that organized groups of Mijal's supporters actually were operating within the country at any time. In general, therefore, these developments can be viewed more as a propaganda facet of the Sino-Soviet dispute than as actual subversion. Broadcasts similar to Mijal's have in fact been beamed by Radio Tirana to the USSR and to all other Eastern European regimes with the exception of Romania. These broadcasts have also

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