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As in other aspects of Gierek's foreign policy, the newfound dynamism in seeking to expand and improve relations with the non-Communist world has tended to obscure the basic factors of continuity and the framework that Gierek inherited from his predecessor. After 1956 Poland's role in presenting to the West either indigenous or joint Warsaw Pact initiatives such as the disarmament and European security proposals provided Polish policymakers with useful vehicles for increased diplomatic activity within the non-Communist world as a whole. Although this role in the international arena reflected the predominantly European focus of Polish foreign policy, often being viewed with justification as an adjunct of its policy towards Germany, the Polish regime also vocally supported such aspects of Soviet foreign policy as "peaceful coexistence," general disarmament, and other steps designed - in its view - to foster improved relations between the superpowers. For example, on 3 May 1969 Poland became the first Communist country whose parliament officially ratified the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. Polish officials also privately indicated strong support for US-Soviet strategic arms limitation talks and the agreements reached in 1972, and for the continuation of the negotiations.

Economic and cultural contacts with the West were also maintained on a relatively high level throughout most of the Gomulka period, albeit influenced by internal as well as external political considerations, and were welcomed by the Polish people. Largely impelled by economic needs, Poland successfully expanded its relations with most of the major Western European countries, especially Italy, the United Kingdom, and France. In the case of the latter, this expansion was bolstered by the political factor of French de facto recognition in 1959 of Poland's western borders, a fact reiterated by former French President de Gaulle during his visit to Poland in September 1967. Poland negotiated significant long-term trade agreements with France and Italy at the end of 1969 and the beginning of 1970. Relations with many of the smaller Western European members of NATO were cultivated avidly, mainly on the basis of what Poland believed to be their receptivity to its various proposals for European security and disarmament. Similarly based contacts have been established and maintained with Europe's neural countries, especially Finland and Austria. In July 1969 Poland was the second Eastern European country, after Romania, to take advantage of the Spanish Government's willingness to supplement its existing commercial ties with some Communist states by the establishment of consular relations. Much of the diplomatic activity by the Polish Government in 1969 was clearly an effort to reestablish some of the momentum of its foreign policy prior to the internal crisis of 1968 and the invasion of Czechoslovakia, events which seriously damaged Poland's image in the international arena.

The Gierek regime has developed these established and broad contacts with Western Europe with the dual objective of expanding bilateral relations - especially economic - and paving the way for a CSCE. Poland's relations with France, which had chilled appreciably after 1968, significantly improved and permitted an official visit to Paris by Gierek and Foreign Minister Olszowski in early October 1972. Warsaw viewed the visit, which included the signing of a 10-year agreement on cooperation in various economic fields, as successful in political and cultural terms as well. Relations with Italy were marked by the signing in October 1971 of an agreement for the mass production of small Fiat automobiles in Poland, and in November of the same year a protocol guaranteed long-term Italian credits for the project. In late 1971 a Polish-UK venture of the joint production of machine tools was agreed upon, and in mid-1972 a major contract was negotiated with the British Petroleum Company for participation in construction of an oil refinery at Gdansk.

Gierek has paid particular attention to expanding Poland's traditionally close relations with the Scandinavian countries. The Polish desire to broaden contacts in all fields, but especially economic, was perhaps symbolized in a tentative agreement with Sweden which is to build a luxury hotel in Warsaw. Political considerations, however, appear to have been paramount in Poland's expanded ties with Finland, which has been in close consultation with the Poles on preparations for the CSCE. In early 1972 Warsaw appointed a senior diplomat, former Deputy Foreign Minister Adam Willman, as ambassador to Helsinki, evidently already with an eye to the multilateral preparatory talks on the conference which were held there late that year. Polish views on European detente and Warsaw's role in it also figured prominently in Foreign Minister Olszowski's extensive travel in both East and West during 1972. He visited Austria, Norway, Romania, Bulgaria, and the USSR, and later in the year he traveled to Bonn, Stockholm, and the UN General Assembly - in addition to accompanying Gierek to Paris. The idea of a CSCE has also been vigorously promoted through numerous informal contacts - such as discussions with foreign diplomats, scholars and journalists - and through the

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