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a series of policy papers on Germany, which included contingency plans covering conditions for the establishment of diplomatic relations. The Polish press, too, began to present a revised view of West Germany, characterized by a more complex and differentiated analysis of West German political life than the stereotypes of the past.

The ground was thus well prepared for Gomulka's major initiative in a speech on 17 May 1969 when for the first time he addressed himself publicly to the German question in terms of Poland's minimum instead of maximum negotiating position. The speech led to a quickened pact of bilateral private and public contacts. The first positive result was the initiation in October 1969 of economic negotiations which, with some interruptions, led to the signing in June 1970 of a new 5-year trade agreement.

Although elaborated and subjected to tactical alterations in subsequent months, the core of the Polish political position remained as stated by Gomulka in his speech of May 1969. He then reiterated Poland's new view of Germany possessed of positive as well as negative forces, and proposed a bilateral treaty, similar to that signed by Poland with East Germany in 1950, through which the Federal Republic would recognize in the "final" character of the Oder-Neisse frontier. The proposal was clearly made with Soviet approval but bore no sign of a coordinated Warsaw Pact move. Rather, it seemed to reflect a new Soviet policy of permitting individual Warsaw Pact countries to seek such settlements of selected, specific bilateral issues with West Germany as would be satisfactory to themselves, while the USSR retained control of questions of common interest.

Within this framework, Gomulka's proposal represented simply the ultimate and genuine Polish position vis-a-vis West Germany, stripped of its hitherto accompanying ballast of East German demands. It reflected the Polish desire that the Government of the Federal Republic renounce all claims to the territory east of the Oder-Neisse line without reference to a future peace treaty, in language clear and binding on itself as well as its successors, but without undercutting East Germany - the only Germany that borders on Poland. Just as the Poles did not wish to undercut East Germany, neither did they wish to violate the Potsdam Agreement which awarded them the territories in question. On the contrary, they wished the Potsdam signatories to approve any agreement they reached with Bonn.

Gomulka's speech found a positive response in a formal proposal on 25 November 1969 by the newly installed West German Government of Chancellor Brandt to begin bilateral talks, and talks were initiated in Warsaw on 5 February 1970. Both sides seemed to realize from the beginning that the success of the negotiations was largely dependent on simultaneous West German talks with the Soviet Union, the then incipient East-West German dialog, and the general climate of relations between the superpowers in Europe and elsewhere. Both sides were businesslike and serious in exploring their objectives, the limitations which bound them, and the possible areas of compromise.

Polish leaders probably knew, as did those of West Germany, that the problem of the Oder-Neisse was simple to state and difficult to resolve. For their part, the Poles probably saw that they would have to be satisfied with some form of de facto recognition of the border which they themselves would be free to proclaim de jure. Both sides were aware that if an agreement in principle on this question could be reached, progress on other bilateral issues would follow. These included the longstanding question of the Polish regime's attitude toward the repatriation of the remaining German minority in Poland and certain categories of mutual restitution claims. The ultimate establishment of diplomatic relations was understood to stand at the end and not the beginning of the negotiating process.

The negotiations on the treaty took place alternately in Warsaw and in Bonn throughout 1970; the negotiators were West German Under Secretary of State Georg Ferdinand Duckwitz and Polish Deputy Foreign Minister Jozef Winiewicz. A compromise agreement on the crucial wording of Bonn's acceptance of the Oder-Neisse border was reached by midyear, i.e., in advance of the initialing in August of the West German-Soviet treaty. In November, a final marathon negotiating session in Warsaw between West German Foreign Minister Walter School and his Polish counterpart, Stefan Jedrychowski, led to the initialing of the treaty on 18 November. Formal signing of the document took place on 7 December 1970 during Chancellor Brandt's visit to Warsaw.

When Gierek took office in Warsaw less than 2 weeks after the signing of the treaty, he allayed the fears of some both at home and abroad by quickly stating his commitment to bring the rapprochement with West Germany to fruition. During 1971 the new leadership continued active contacts with West German representatives, welcoming to Warsaw not only supporters of Chancellor Brandt but also several ranking members of the opposition Christian

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