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 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA-RDP01-00707R000200070029-7

'''FIGURE 10. Gierek and his constituents, the workers (U/OU)''' (picture)

elements of the people. Moreover, cabinet ministers, party leaders, and leaders of mass organizations have submitted to often critical interviews on radio and television.

While Gierek has retained firm control over the public information media, he has used more open treatment of domestic problems as a safety valve for popular dissatisfaction, a means to overcome public apathy, and as a catalyst for constructive change. Gierek's creation early in his tenure of a post of Under Secretary of State for Information was a major step in this direction. In the same vein, Gierek has tolerated, and in some cases encouraged, mildly provocative articles in the press bearing on and stimulating public discussion of long-range social and economic problems and options facing the country.

The degree to which Gierek has succeeded in engaging persons from all walks of life in his program reveals another major feature of his scheme for improving the political climate so that his domestic reforms can better take hold; his acceptance of the concept, first articulated by Hungarian party leader Kadar, that "all those who are not against us are with us." Thus, Gierek has not only ostentatiously appointed many workers and respected non-party professionals to numerous positions on all but the top levels of government, but he has pledged himself to eliminate discriminatory distinctions based on an individual's class background or religious beliefs. This concept appears designed not only to buttress his policy of improving church-state relations, but also to heal the wounds in the body politic that had been rubbed raw during Gomulka's last years in power. The politically motivated anti-Semitic purges that characterized the intra-party factional struggle of 1968 and the exodus of many of Poland's remaining Jews that followed have fortuitously made the question of domestic anti-Semitism a moot one for the Gierek regime. Notably, however, Gierek either did not take part in or soon disassociated himself from the anti-Semitic excesses of 1968. Since Gierek came to power, the element of anti-Semitism has not discernibly entered the large-scale housecleaning of officials in the party and government bureaucracies.

These tangible changes in domestic policies, and in the style of rule that is designed to make them convincing, have been accompanied by a massive public relations campaign to project a new image of the party and the government - that of a responsible and responsive servant of the people. While much of this campaign has been self-serving and disingenuous in Western terms, its cumulative impact has had a positive influence not only on the people's view of their rulers, but also on the rulers' view of themselves. Moreover, an important spinoff of this campaign has been Gierek's cautious appeal to Polish patriotism and pride in national accomplishment as a way to generate support for his policies.

At first sight, this appears as a radical and dangerous innovation for a Communist leader, and one that flirts with the sin of nationalism. Gierek has been careful, however, to emphasize the trappings rather than the substance of nationalism and, together with his repeated warnings against non-constructive agitation, has kept the popular response to this campaign within permissible limits. For example,

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APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA-RDP01-00707R000200070029-7