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Nevertheless, Gierek was aware from the beginning that he would need them, especially the intellectuals, to mobilize the population at large as well as to balance the dominant influence of the working class on his regime. The new policy of encouraging private service occupations and private or cooperative enterprises, often under license to the state but otherwise relatively unrestricted, was specifically designed to elicit good will from these elements of the population.

In the cultural field, no major departures from former policies have been made but the regime's olive branch extended to the country's traditionally volatile intellectuals appears to have been accepted, even though cautiously. Gierek's spokesmen on cultural policy have emphasized that although the principle of party control over culture must remain intact and censorship will continue to be exercised, there is artistic freedom for all those who do not produce works "hostile to socialism or challenge our fraternal alliances," i.e., neither the basic orientation of the domestic system nor Poland's alliance with the Soviet Union must be questioned. Most Polish intellectuals, especially the older generation, appear inclined to accept the terms of this softer cultural policy, especially since it has permitted many previously banned authors to reappear in print and, more importantly, has been accompanied by a liberalized policy on foreign travel for intellectuals. Little noticed, but also important, was the government's extension of social security coverage to writers, artists, and others who had previously been ineligible on the grounds that they were self-employed.

A particularly significant policy departure by the Gierek regime, and one designed to gain the support of the majority of the population, has been its commitment to improved relations with the Roman Catholic Church, the institutional focus of the 95% of the people who are Catholics. Three days after taking office, the government offered to "normalize" church-state relations, which for decades had alternated between uneasy truces and outright crises. A meeting in early March 1971 between Cardinal Stefan Wyszynski, Primate of Poland, and Premier Jaroszewicz symbolized at the highest level the beginning of a dialog which has since then been extended to negotiations both between the Polish regime and the Vatican. The Wyszynski-Jaroszewicz meeting appears to have led to several government concessions. In June 1971, ecclesiastical property in the former German territories was formally turned over to the Polish church. In February 1972, regulations requiring the church to keep full inventory of its property for tax purposes were abolished.

Although much of the improved domestic atmosphere is cosmetic and church-state friction continues to exist, especially at the parish level, the steps taken by the regime have produced a climate in which a formal domestic church-state accommodation and a Polish-Vatican agreement - possible a concordat - no longer seems to be ruled out. In June 1972, the Vatican regularized the church's status in the former German territories, a move that was hailed by the regime as a major step toward further progress.

Despite the significant policy reforms that Gierek has initiated in the domestic area, the degree of his success in obtaining popular support and generating hopes for a better future stem less from specific policy shifts than from his new style of rule, which is designed to convince the people that he is genuinely dedicated to overcoming the crisis of confidence between the rulers and the ruled which developed during the Gomulka era.

Since coming to power, Gierek has been consistent: he has avoided repression, while indicating that social discipline is one of the key elements for the success of his policy of "national renewal." He has condemned the errors of the past, but has stressed the the party and its genuine accomplishments are unassailable even though leaders may come and go. He has made concessions, but has warned of the dangers for the national interest inherent in excessive pressures from below. He has stressed the need for increased efficiency in government and its responsiveness to the people, but has also emphasized that this is a two-way street. During innumerable face-to-face meetings with workers during his first months in office and with people in all walks of life since then, Gierek has sought to demonstrate an open style and to establish a direct dialog between the party, the government, and the people.

This more open style is characterized by the practices initiated at the top levels of the party and government. For example meetings of the party's policymaking Politburo under Gomulka were rarely held and never publicized. Under Gierek meetings are more frequent, often expanded to include non-party specialists, and the results are regularly published in abbreviated form. Unlike the cabalistic practices of Gomulka's top leadership, members of Gierek's Politburo, Secretariat, and Central Committee departments, as well as government ministers and their deputies are accessible to each other, and maintain contact with the workers and with other

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APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA-RDP01-00707R000200070029-7