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control. He acted energetically and with great political skill, moving on a broad front to attack the most urgent problems first, while not ignoring the others. In this war he not only effectively defused existing tensions but also began - almost imperceptibly - to formulate and implement a long-range program of economic and social reforms. At the same time he left no doubt that he remained in full charge of the reform process.

By the beginning of 1973, Gierek's measured pace had generated impatience among some Poles, while the implications of some of his reforms undoubtedly created concern among conservative Communists both at home and abroad. Nevertheless, it is clear that Gierek's policies are not based on a renunciation of the past; indeed, continuity, especially in foreign policy, remained the watchword. Thus, the basic principles of Polish national policies in the early 1970s reflect considerable - in most instances total - autonomy in domestic affairs, guided by pragmatic considerations, and a strong commitment to the Polish-Soviet alliance in terms of mutual support for common foreign policy objectives. It is clear that in their general nature, these policy principles are close to, if not identical with, those prevailing during the Gomulka era. But, as Gierek's reforms already suggest, he is intent on fully utilizing the room for maneuver which these principles furnish.

In their specifics, Gierek's policies are based on undisputed party supremacy, a recognition of the endemic popular hostility to communism, a commitment to satisfy widespread popular pressure for tangible increases in material welfare, acknowledgement of the special effects of the social and economic individualism of the Polish peasant on agricultural production, acceptance of the traditional role of the Roman Catholic Church as guardian of the national identity, and finally and most important, a style of rule designed to elicit that degree of trust and confidence between the rulers and the ruled needed to fully harness the energies of the people. So far, Gierek has given the appearance of a leader fully confident that he can employ these principles of rule without jeopardizing domestic stability or contravening the letter of the spirit of the Polish-Soviet alliance. He must also realize, however, that his long-term future and that of Poland depend on his being correct in this assessment.

2. Domestic policies (C)

Gierek's domestic policy has been focused on improving the living conditions of the Polish people and generating the popular support that would make his plans for economic improvement successful. This dual effort has evolved through a first stage of basically stopgap measures into a broader program of more fundamental but measured and moderate social and economic improvements.

Gierek's immediate moves to defuse the December 1970 crisis and to gain support from his militant worker constituency were hindered by the fact that he had little more to offer them in concrete material terms than did his predecessor. He began by scrapping Gomulka's ill-fated wage-incentive system, which had entailed a 2-year freeze for most workers while expanding bonuses for a few, and by raising the incomes of 4 million of the lowest paid workers and pensioners. But these were not the relatively better paid workers who had sparked the riots, and those workers remained skeptical and dissatisfied. A second wave of strikes in January and February 1971 forced Gierek into even more frequent personal appearances before the workers throughout the country; he also had to increase the tempo of local efforts to improve working conditions and, above all, the strikes forced him, in March 1971, to rescind the price rises of the previous December. Moreover, Gierek promised that food prices would remain frozen for 2 years, a freeze that has since been extended to cover 1973. To reassure the workers and housewives about the food supply, Gierek promised substantial increases in meat supply and, largely with the help of a $100 million hard currency loan from the USSR, managed to raise meat consumption considerably. These immediate measures, together with Gierek's strong personal appeal, generated a positive response from the workers and gave him time to fulfill his promises. The workers, aware that persistence and boldness on their part has bred success, have shown that they will continue to hold the new regime accountable for its promises of increased welfare and a new role for themselves in the determination of economic policy. The fact that Gierek's innovations in labor policy were initially forced on him by the workers' militancy does not detract from their novelty nor from the fact that, despite continued shortcomings, a new institutional and operational relationship appears to be developing between the regime and labor in Poland.

Gierek also realized early in his tenure that though the farmers were not involved in the initial manifestations of the workers' discontent, the cooperation of the peasantry would be vital to insuring adequate food supplies. Abandoning Gomulka's long and fruitless search for self-sufficiency in grain, a search which had adversely affected meat and dairy

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