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a measure of the compromises that characterized Polish-Soviet relations in the post-1956 period.

Because the process of Gomulka's accommodation with Moscow paralleled the development of diversity in Eastern Europe and the growth of nationalism everywhere, Poland soon shed the appearance of being a unique state within the Communist sphere. On the contrary, Gomulka's increasingly close alliance with the USSR made him seem to turn his back on the nationalistic legacy of 1956 and to be out of step with the nationalistic trends elsewhere in Eastern Europe, trends with persisted and grew despite the chastened ideological atmosphere following the invasion of Czechoslovakia. Nevertheless, Gomulka probably believed that he was true to a special form of pro-Soviet nationalism which assumed that pursuit of Poland's national interests was possibly only with explicit Soviet consent in each instance. For this reason, Gomulka repeatedly stressed that Poland's geopolitical position did not permit it to pursue Romanian-style independence; he acted in the belief that Poland does not have this option without becoming a weak pawn in the East-West confrontation in Central Europe. He believed Poland's alliance with the USSR to be historically unavoidable - "for better or worse" were his words at the Party Congress in November 1968 - and the only alternative to another of the national disasters which, in his view, resulted from past Polish alliances with Western powers. His conviction on this score strengthened his simultaneous efforts to seek such openings in Soviet foreign policy as would permit Poland to press its own persistent search for security in Europe.

After years of failure, this search gathered momentum in 1969-1970 when historical circumstances together with largely coinciding Polish and Soviet interests permitted Poland not only to refurbish its 1964 initiative for a European security conference, on behalf of the Soviet bloc as a whole, but also to initiate a mutually long-sought dialog with West Germany designed to reach a rapprochement on the basis of West Germany's acceptance of Poland's postwar borders. The resultant successful negotiation of the Polish-West German treaty was at once Gomulka's greatest foreign policy triumph and his swansong. In the eyes of many Poles it came too late; even more critically, it was brought at the price of social and economic neglect and ineptitude at home. One week after Gomulka observed Chancellor Brandt sign the treaty in Warsaw - on 7 December 1970 - the Polish leader was reaping the bitter fruit of his domestic mismanagement, an uprising of the workers which had resulted, by 20 December 1970, in Gomulka's relegation to the pages of history.

When Edward Gierek came to power in Poland his policy options were extremely narrow. The uprisings in the coastal cities threatened to spread throughout the country as restive workers in other industries began to resort to work stoppages. Gierek's situation was complicated by several factors, not the least of which was the disappointing performance of the economy. Sorely needed measures to revitalize the economy had been delayed so long that by 1970 drastic measures had to be introduced, inflicting severe hardships on the population. The Poles, however, after over two decades of extensive industrialization and limited consumption, were in no mood to accept further deprivations and instead demanded to have their sacrifices tangibly rewarded with an improved standard of living. Against this background, it was hardly surprising that the Gomulka regime's ill-timed move to increase food prices sparked the December 1970 workers' riots. Gierek quickly reversed his predecessor's harsh action, but as for further economic relief to the population at large, he could do little more than promise better things some time in the future.

Gierek also had to cope with the face that the credibility of the Communist regime had been seriously undermined. The vast majority of Poles, who had supported Gomulka in 1956 only to become thoroughly disillusioned with him over the ensuing decade and a half, were not disposed to place unqualified trust in the promises of his successor. The people, in short, demanded action rather than mere promises, and the new leadership could no longer count on their unlimited patience.

Finally, Gierek had to plan his new policies with one eye on Moscow. True, the Soviet Union had acted with unusual restraint during the December 1970 crisis, carefully avoiding any overt interference in Polish affairs. The new Polish leaders were promptly endorsed by Moscow, and in February 1971 the Soviets extended credits to help Gierek cope with the country's most urgent economic problems. Yet, heightened Soviet sensitivity to political changes in the aftermath of the events of 1968 in Czechoslovakia was doubtless a factor that Gierek could not ignore. There was the danger that, if the situation in Poland were to get out of hand, the USSR might shed its restraint and intervene militarily.

The combined effects of all these factors was to impose severe restrictions on Gierek's room for political maneuver. Yet, within a relatively short time, he managed to bring the situation in the country under

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