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subsequent decline in the numbers of members removed from the party together with the steady influx of new members resulted in new growth. On 1 January 1970 the Polish party claimed 2.2 million members, and on the eve of the December 1970 change in regime, claimed party membership stood at 2.32 million members and candidates. A relatively low key but thorough screening of the party membership conducted by the Gierek regime throughout 1971 resulted in a purge of an estimated 100,000 members and a diminished rate of new applications. By December 1971, when the numbers of new applicants again began to increase, the total membership of the party was claimed to be 2.27 million, or about 11% of the population over the age of 18.

Because the process of weeding out party deadwood and inactive or unreliable members is still continuing at a diminished rate, firm data on the internal composition of the party is scanty. Nevertheless, despite the adverse impact of the December 1970 crises and subsequent purges on the total membership of the party, its social composition appears to have remained relatively stable. Workers were said to form a somewhat higher percentage of new applicants in 1971 than formerly, but it is unlikely that workers in fact represent more than approximately 40% of the membership, a ratio which tended to be stable throughout the 1960s. Peasants have shunned the party almost as a matter of principle, with their numbers never rising about 12% of the total membership. Together, the workers and peasants thus form a bare majority within the party's rank and file, while the single most numerous group has consistently been that of white-collar workers who hold about 43% of the membership. Some indication of the relative attractiveness or the necessity of party membership for certain professions is illustrated by official data released in 1968 which claimed that 40% of all engineers belonged to the party, 41% of all teachers, 25% of all scientists, and 17% of all doctors. Significantly, it was also noted that only 4.7% of all students and faculty in institutions of higher learning were members of the Communist party.

The party has given much publicity to the slowly declining average age of party members. As a result of purges and of natural attrition among longtime members over 58% of the membership in 1970 were under 40 years of age, and less than 20% were persons who were Communists before the creation of the PZPR in 1948. About 25% of the membership were under 29 years of age, and about 10% were between the ages of 18 and 24. The proportion of women in the party, never high, is also slowly increasing; in 1970 women formed about 20% of the membership, but almost one-third of the candidates accepted that year. The majority of party members have always tended to reside in the industrial and administrative centers of the country, although growing urbanization of formerly predominantly agricultural areas has tended to make the geographical distribution of party members more even over the years.

Most Poles who are party members, old and new alike, have sought and maintained membership as a matter of convenience, for purposes of career advancement or enhanced material welfare though not social prestige. These motives are often coupled with a belief that by working through, instead of against, the establishment they can better contribute to national development. Probably less than 10% of 15% of the membership are ideologically convinced Communists.

2. Other parties and pressure groups (C)

The PZPR's effective monopoly of power over virtually all aspects of national life has precluded the lasting existence of any of the variety of organized, non-Communist, political and social pressure groups that flourished for a time in the period immediately following October 1956 - a period when the disintegration of party control in effect resulted in an organizational vacuum. Since then, the one significant exception to this rule has been the still powerful Roman Catholic Church, whose ubiquitous presence in Poland and consistent impregnability to Communist infiltration and subjection has resulted in the Polish regime's being the world's only ruling Communist government forced to recognize an organized, albeit unequal, social and political authority in its midst - Catholicism.

Because of Poland's historical struggle against domination by Protestant Prussia and Orthodox Russia, Catholicism became at once a powerful faith and an embodiment of the national identity. Following World War II, the church again assumed its traditional role as a rallying point for resistance against alien rule imposed by a foreign power. Despite the temporary church-state modus vivendi of 1956, alternating truces and crises characterized church relations with the state throughout the Gomulka era. Since the assumption of power by Gierek, the new regime has taken several major steps to place these relations on a significantly different footing. Mindful of the church's identification with Polish nationalism, and realizing that the frontal attacks against it in the past had proved counterproductive, the Gierek regime made a public commitment as early as December 1970

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