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cooperation with the Ministry of Justice and the Ministry of Internal Affairs (responsible for police activities). A law of April 1967 further underscored the claimed independence of the Prosecutor General's office and entrusted it with the general supervision of the entire government administration of justice. The law also provided that the post of the chief military prosecutor be subordinate to the civilian Prosecutor General. These provisions in many ways paralleled the February 1962 reorganization of the Supreme Court, which is composed of four "chambers" dealing with criminal, civil, military, and social security cases, respectively. Although both of the Supreme Court's absorption in 1962 of the functions of the formerly independent Supreme Military Tribunal and the 1967 subordination of the military to the civilian prosecutor were propagandized as evidence of the supremacy of the civilian system, it appears that the merger in both cases was designed to bring those cases which remain under military court jurisdiction (espionage and security) under greater centralized control. Similarly, the strengthening of the independent status of the Prosecutor General's office, i.e., removing vestiges of its organizational dependence on the Ministry of Justice, has in fact enabled the party to exercise more direct control over prosecutors on all levels and, through them, over the entire judicial system.

Standing outside of the regular court system but supplementing it are the "administrative commissions" of the local people's councils, which act as lay courts and perform a judicial function similar to that of magistrates' courts in the United States. In addition, there exists a system of "social courts" which are supposed to use social persuasion rather than formal penal sanctions in case of "antisocial" behavior and other disputes and activities not susceptible to direct legal prosecution. These "courts," in practice loosely organized groups of selected workers, were established over the years in many factories and other places of work and were formalized by the law of January 1965 which entrusted local trade union bodies with supervising and assisting in their activities. The formalization of the "social courts" and public emphasis on the activities of the "administrative commissions" of local government organs reflect official efforts to curtail hooliganism, offenses against labor discipline, and other misdemeanors, as well as to relieve some of the pressure on the overburdened regular court system.

Prior to 1954 the entire judicial system was devoted primarily to entrenching the Communist regime and to suppressing all real and imagined popular hostility to it. After 1954 the administration of justice gradually improved, primarily as a result of the decline in the power of the secret police and the gradual assumption by both prosecutors and defense attorneys of their formerly usurped functions. For some time after the October 1956 change of regime Polish courts even tended to side with the defense almost as a matter of principle, and were frequently criticized by the regime for extreme leniency.

By the early 1960s this tendency was largely reversed, particularly with reference to economic offenses. Although the judicial system remains relatively free of dominance by the police apparatus, it is not even relatively independent of party control. In 1960, largely as a result of its failure to curb embezzlement and theft of state property, the government reintroduced the death penalty for economic crimes, but did not use it until 1965. Summary court procedure - from which there is no appeal - was introduced for this most prevalent category of criminal activity in Poland. These measures were part of the general overhaul of the legal system which began in late 1960 and which was designed to provide more aggressive prosecutions and more severe sentences for major offenses. There is no indication that the Gierek regime plans to make major changes in the court system or to deemphasize ultimate party control. The new regime's stress on "socialist democracy" and justice is viewed by most Poles as a welcome and probably a genuine commitment, but at the same time there appears to be considerable popular support for the official emphasis on law and order in the general sense or curbing nonpolitical criminal behavior.

The relations of the legal profession with the regime have gone through several stages similar to those within the judicial system as a whole. During the period prior to 1954 the influence and role of the defense within judicial proceedings were circumscribed both by law and by the practical intimidation practiced by the police appratus. Gradually, as the power of the security appratus over the courts declined and then virtually disappeared with events of October 1956, the legal profession regained much of its prewar prestige and its role within the courts. In the late 1950s lawyers were in the forefront of resistance to the gradual but systematic reassertion by the regime - this time the party and not the police - of power over the judicial system. In many cases, the legal profession's opposition to retrogressive measures in both law and procedure proposed after 1960 delayed their implementation. By the same token, however, this opposition caused the regime to increase its

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APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA-RDP01-00707R000200070029-7