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discussion of proposed legislation, and its deputies were being increasingly charged by the regime with maintaining close contact with the opinions of their constituents.

None of these changes in emphasis result from shifts in the political spectrum of the legislature; in fact, the apportionment of seats in the Sejm between the Polish United Workers Party (PZPR, i.e., Communist party), the two puppet parties, and the non-party delegates is pre-determined by the regime in advance of the single-slate elections. Indeed, the results of the last three elections - in May 1965, June 1969, and March 1972 - have been identical in this respect. Of the 460 deputies elected in all three of these elections, 255 belonged to the PZPR, which controls the Sejm not only through its numerical preponderance but through a tightly organized caucus (called a "club") of its deputies. Similar "clubs" or executive-style organs insure the responsiveness to Communist policies by deputies of the puppet parties - the United Peasant Party (ZSL) with 117 deputies, and the Democratic Party (SD) with 39 deputies.

Of the 49 deputies without party affiliation who were elected in the 1972 elections, 13 were lay Catholics, but only five of the 13 were adherents to the Catholic parliamentary group Znak (Sign), a grouping with ties to the Roman Catholic episcopate, and one which - unlike the remainder of the lay Catholic deputies - traditionally could not be depended upon by the Communists for automatic support of their policies. After an initial upsurge in Znak influence within the more liberal atmosphere that followed the coming to power of the Gomulka regime in 1956, growing harassment by the increasingly conservative Gomulka apparatus made the importance of Znak more symbolic than real. Nevertheless, it remained the closest approximation to an organized opposition to any Communist parliamentary body. By 1972, the departure from the political sense of some of Znak's formerly prominent members, as well as the Gierek regime's good relations with the church had further diminished Znak's role of gadfly in the Sejm.

Despite the unchanged political spectrum of the Sejm after the 1972 elections, these elections resulted in an unprecedentedly large turnover of deputies and a similarly increased proportion of younger and working-class deputies. This characteristic of the new parliament parallels the rejuvenation of the top party and government leadership under Gierek's tenure. Indeed, in 1972 the average age of Poland's parliamentary deputies, like its top leaders, was the lowest in Eastern Europe.

The dramatic overhaul of the new Sejm is reflected in the fact that 291 of the 460 deputies elected in 1972 were freshmen, a turnover of approximately 63%. Notably, in six of the total of 80 constituencies no incumbent delegates even sought reelection, and only one incumbent stood for reelection in each of 18 other constituencies. Not surprisingly, those constituencies where the slate was completely or virtually new were predominantly those of the Baltic coastal cities that were the focal points of the December 1970 workers' revolt. About two-thirds of the total Sejm deputies are under the age of 50, although only slightly over 2% are under the age of 30; the average age is between 40 and 50. The most numerous occupation group is made up of the 121 deputies who are party, central, or local governmental officials, and leading members of various social and mass organizations. The remaining deputies include 98 workers (an unusually large contingent), 66 peasants, and 175 journalists, teachers, doctors, and representatives of other white collar occupations.

The Sejm elected in 1957 conducted genuine debates and initiated legislation in practice as well as in theory, and for a time was the only legislature operating in the Communist world with a limited voice in policymaking. By 1961, however, its legislative powers were brought fully under the control of the PZPR, its plenary sessions made less numerous and shorter, and its capacity for debate curtailed except when this served Communist purpose. Despite regime strictures on its activity, however, the Sejm never fully reverted to the rubber-stamp pattern of the pre-1956 period. Government draft bills, particularly budgetary items and sensitive measures involving potentially adverse public reaction, frequently got thorough review in the Sejm commissions and were subject to criticism and change in detail. In addition, interpellations, occasional dissenting votes, and carefully phrased criticism from the floor continued to be tolerated, though not encouraged, by the Communist leaders. This floor activity, however, was generally unpublicized.

Under the more permissive and dynamic political climate imparted by the Gierek regime, the newly rejuvenated parliament shows renewed signs of exercising its prerogatives and thus becoming a more genuine deliberative body. Although it is unlikely that the Sejm will play any more of a policymaking role vis-a-vis the controlling Communist party leadership than hitherto - nor can it hope to initiate major legislation without the party's guidance and approval - parliament's more representative composition will enable it to keep in closer touch with the tenor of public opinion. Moreover, the Gierek regime's

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APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA-RDP01-00707R000200070029-7