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vagueness of constitutional language that permits arbitrary interpretation than on any specifically repressive provisions.

The 1952 constitution contains a structural delineation of legislative, executive, and judicial branches of the government, but there is no system of checks and balances, either in theory or in practice, to enforce an actual separation of powers. Nor are there any provisions which might prevent the arbitrary abuse of power by the government's dominant executive branch, whose key members are simultaneously either members of the Communist party leadership or are their trusted colleagues. Similarly, although the legislature is allegedly the supreme agent of state power, it is in practice a tool in the hands of the few leaders comprising the executive branch. Since the government is, in theory, a parliamentary, multi-party democracy, provisions for orderly governmental succession are implicit in the legislature's power to appoint the President as well as the Premier. However, because parliament's role is dictated and controlled by the Communist party, where no practical provisions for succession exist, the issue of governmental succession is meaningless and is wholly dependent on intra-Communist Party Politics.

Despite the party's admitted control over the use of the governmental apparatus at all levels as an instrument to implement both its domestic and foreign policies, the Polish regime has consistently put great stress on the maintenance of correct legal form and protocol in the relations between the top echelons of the party and government hierarchies, and has insisted on the recognition of the theoretical separation of the two systems when dealing with non-Communist countries. The Gierek regime's emphasis on rejuvenating government's role in the system and perhaps on making its lower levels less subject to ubiquitous party supervision suggests that the theoretical separation of the party and government may be imbued, if only tentatively and experimentally, with some practical content. In addition, Gierek's stress on safeguards against arbitrary abuses of power by both party and government bureaucracies at all levels may result in a more precise if not liberal constitutional redefinition of the relationships of governmental agencies on various levels between themselves as well as with parallel party bodies.

2. Governmental structure and practice (C)

a. Legislature

The unicameral Polish legislature, known as the Sejm (assembly, i.e. parliament), is elected by universal suffrage for a 4-year term, and by law must be convened for plenary sessions at least twice a year by the Council of State. Much of the work of the Sejm, however, is done by its 19 specialized committees and commissions, which may review legislation proposed by the executive branch of the government, in sittings outside of the regular plenary sessions. Although parliament theoretically initiates legislation, in practice draft bills are submitted to it by designated deputies acting on behalf of the executive, which in turn acts on behalf of the Communist party. In addition to a Rules and Mandate Commission, there were in 1972 the following 18 specialized bodies working within the Sejm:

Commission for:
 * Agriculture and Food Industry
 * Communications
 * Construction and Communal Economy
 * Culture and Art
 * Domestic Trade
 * Economic Plan, Budget, and Finance
 * Education and Science
 * Foreign Affairs
 * Foreign Trade
 * Forestry and Wood Industry
 * Health and Physical Culture
 * Heavy Industry, Chemical Industry, and Mining
 * Internal Affairs
 * Justice
 * Labor and Social Matters
 * Light Industry, Handicrafts, and Labor Cooperatives
 * Merchant Marine and Railroads
 * National Defense

Until 1960 the Sejm was elected on the basis of one deputy for every 60,000 inhabitants. A constitutional amendment of December 1960 established a constant number of 460 deputies. Because of the country's growth in population, each deputy represents a growing number of constituents. In 1972 this ratio stood at one deputy for every 71,500 inhabitants.

Under Communist rule, the Sejm has never been a genuine legislative and policymaking body; all these functions have been, in fact, performed by the inner councils of the Communist leadership and presented as finished acts for pro forma approval by the parliament. Within these circumscribed limits parliament's deliberative role and its influence on the character of legislation submitted to it has fluctuated in direct relation to the political climate within the Communist party, and to the willingness of the party to air its policies before the population. In 1972, following the first national elections under the Gierek regime (held on 19 March 1972, a year in advance of constitutional requirements), the Sejm once again appeared to be assuming a more prominent role in the

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APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA-RDP01-00707R000200070029-7