Page:CIA-RDP01-00707R000200070027-9.pdf/8

 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA-RDP01-00707R000200070027-9

failure, Gierek was confronted with a number of formidable tasks. First of all, he had to defuse the explosive situation on the coast and gain control over the cumbersome PUWP and government bureaucracies. Equally important, he had to inaugurate a new but ideologically acceptable style of rule, which would restore popular confidence in the regime, appeal to patriotic sentiment, and engage the cooperation and support of the largest possible part of the population in efforts to revive Poland's sagging economy. He was faced, in effect, with the need to foster a genuine national revival without altering the basic features of Poland's existing Communist system or releasing the spontaneous pressures for societal change which had doomed with Dubcek experiment in Czechoslovakia. Finally, although the Soviet Union and Poland's other Warsaw Pact Allies had been quick to endorse his regime, he had to insure that they would go along with his domestic innovations and continue to provide him with both political and economic support. (C)

Fortunately for Gierek, there were some aspects of the situation in December 1970 which worked to his advantage - including the widespread reputation as a tough, competent, and fair administrator he had earned during his 13-year tenure as PUWP chieftain in Katowice province (the core of the Silesian industrial area). For one thing, although the dissident workers laid most of their grievances at the party's door, Poland's socialist system as such was not under direct attack. Nor had the demonstrations taken on an anti-Soviet coloration. Moreover, open agitation was pretty well limited to the urban working class and, even more narrowly, to the skilled workers who felt that they had the most to lose from Gomulka's heavy-handed economic policies. Despite growing uncertainty about Gomulka's ultimate intentions with respect to collectivization, the peasants were quiet. Whether out of caution of out of pique over the failure of the workers to come to their support in protesting political and cultural repression in 1968, so were the students and intellectuals. Although clearly sympathetic to the workers, the powerful Roman Catholic Church kept its peace except to counsel nonviolence. On a more general plane, still fresh memories of the Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia operated both to temper the behavior of the Polish population and to incline Warsaw's allies toward cooperation with Gomulka's successor in hopes of avoiding the nee for a repeat performance. (C)

Even so, popular skepticism and impatience, the critical state of the economy, and Moscow's ever-present shadow all imposed severe restrictions on Gierek's freedom of maneuver. Hence his success in meeting most of his initial objectives before he had completed a full year in office attests to his considerable political and administrative skills. Indeed, things did not go too well at first, and Gierek was soon confronted with a second - albeit nonviolent - round of strikes. But by mid-February, he had persuaded Moscow to provide him with the financial assistance and added measure of political support he needed to stabilize Poland's domestic scene. Thus he was able to roll back Gomulka's aggravating price increases and to initiate a carefully phased series of personnel changes designed to remove imcompetents and potential opponents from positions where they could hinder his plans. (C)

By mid-1971, Gierek had greatly strengthened his control over the principal mechanisms of political power, and his cautiously implemented program of domestic renewal - with its emphasis on constructive dialogue, patriotism, material well-being, and social reform - had won him a period of grace in the eyes of most Poles. His improved position enabled Gierek to

2

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA-RDP01-00707R000200070027-9