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his ideas on how the organization should carry out its functions are far different from those of his predecessor. This too has had a marked effect on Poland's internal climate.

In general terms, Gierek has sought to lower the party's profile, not only vis-a-vis the people, but also in relation to the government. He believes that the party should formulate general policy guidelines (drawing heavily on nonparty expertise), monitor and mobilize, persuade and pressure. Without prejudice to the PUWP's ultimate power to intervene, the practical implementation of basic policy should be left to the appropriate governmental bodies and mass organizations. Increased efficiency is one consideration, but by divorcing the party from the day-to-day management of Poland's political and economic affairs, Gierek evidently also hopes to cushion it against future crises in public confidence.

In the economic field, Gierek has had to contend with structure problems resulting from under-investment in food processing, the construction industry, transport and communication, and agriculture. Moreover, Gomulka's policies had caused Poland to drag its feet in introducing technological change and improvements in management and planning. By rights, Poland - with its relatively ample natural resources, with nearly half of its total land area under cultivation, and with its consistently high overall level of investment - should have been one of the most prosperous countries within the Soviet bloc. Yet after a quarter century of Communist rule, its per capita GNP was only $1,650, about on a par with Bulgaria and Hungary but far lower than the levels that had been achieved in East Germany, Czechoslovakia, or the USSR.

Thus Warsaw has had to pursue its quest for greater efficiency and increased production on a number of fronts. Hand in hand with his efforts to win the cooperation of the peasantry, Gierek has sought to encourage the growth of private services and of state-licensed but otherwise relatively independent private or cooperative enterprises. He greatly intensified the drive to acquire Western technology in order to restructure and modernize Polish industry. He has come up with a new program for improving the system of planning and management which prescribes greater responsibility to the enterprises but also the strengthening of central control. In addition, he has made some effort to streamline Poland's cumbersome economic bureaucracy.

Nevertheless, Gierek's approach to institutional change has been cautious. No economic reforms of the scale introduced in Hungary in 1968 are presently in sight. For the time being, at least, Gierek hopes simply to "energize" the existing system, and thus his most striking departures from Gomulka's economic policies has been to cast aside their orthodox emphasis on heavy industry in favor of a more balanced - and more consumer-oriented - approach to economic development. A change in procedure as well as in priorities has been involved here. Reversing previous practice, targets for increases in average real wages, consumption, and employment are now established at the outset of the planning cycle. In theory, at least, these figures are then used in working out all other indices of the plan, including, for example, production targets and estimated investment outlays.

The draft 1971-75 economic plan which Gomulka had prepared quite naturally and to be scrapped. A substitute, embodying Gierek's new approach, was developed during 1971 by a commission of experts headed by Politburo member Jan Szydlak and was formally approved by the parliament in 1972. Its goals with respect to improving the economic and social lot of the average Pole are ambitious. Real wages are to rise by 18% while working hours are to be reduced. In contrast to Gomulka's willingness to countenance a high jobless rate, full employment to be sought - a goal which will require the creation of some 1.8 million new positions for young people entering the job market. A comprehensive review and reform of the educational system is scheduled. The variety and quality of consumer goods are to be improved, in part through imports. A substantial number of inexpensive personal automobiles are to be produced and marketed. Over 1 million new dwelling units are to be constructed. If, however, Gierek is to fulfill his pledge that every Polish family will have its own suitable place to life by 1990, about 6 million more dwellings will have to be completed during the next three 5-year planning periods.

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