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Gierek has combined his conciliatory approach to "believers" and other nonparty elements with a broad but cautiously implemented campaign to engage Polish patriotism in support of his politics. This distinctive aspect of his renewal strategy was highlighted by the decision to rebuild the ancient royal castle in Warsaw and by the substitution of the centuries-old national seal - the Polish eagle - for the previously omnipresent portraits of party and government leaders in official buildings throughout the country. It has also been reflected in unprecedented public praise of the past patriotic exploits of individual religious leaders and in the muting of ideological themes during Poland's national day celebration.

Gierek's new style of leadership has also been evident in the changes - both cosmetic and substantive - that he has effected in Poland's political institutions. On one hand, it has resulted in a concerted campaign to upgrade the technical competence of the government bureaucracy as well as in a radical streamlining of Poland's rural administrative structure. On the other hand, it has dictated a number of modest moves designed to breath some life into Poland's moribund organs of "socialist democracy." Thus Gierek has sought to encourage debate in the Sejm (parliament) and its commissions. He has made some gestures toward Poland's non-Marxist political parties - the United Peasant Party and the Democratic Party - as well as toward various other organized interest groups by soliciting their advice on matters of interest to their members. He has rejuvenated the leadership of Poland's political umbrella organization, the National Unity Front, and has made it more representative of the full spectrum of the front's membership. In addition, he has promised his countrymen a new constitution.

The party, like the government, has been given a new face and a whole new team of leaders. Gierek has not only staffed its upper echelons with younger and more competent officials, but he has quietly purged some 100,000 rank-and-file members from its rolls. In keeping with the spirit of the times, he has stressed collegial leadership and restoration of "democratic" practices. Breaking with Gomulka's methods, he has regularly convened full meetings of the Politburo and has often invited nonparty specialists to attend. And although he has emphasized party discipline and moved firmly against old factional alliances, he has encouraged constructive debate, a freer flow of information and suggestions from below, and the delegation of sufficient authority to lower echelons to permit resolution of most local problems without reference to Warsaw.

Gierek's approach to the democratization and decentralization of the PUWP has been understandably cautious. He is very much determined to preserve the "leading role" of the party - both his position at home and his acceptability to Moscow depend upon his doing so. He has, in fact, declared his intention to anchor party primacy in constitutional law. But, although Gierek is no more willing than Gomulka to countenance reforms which could weaken the party,

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