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rather than by trying to identify and remedy the underlying grievances. Hence the cycle would repeat itself, with the population becoming increasingly alienated and the top echelons of the regime increasingly hostile to criticism and resistant to change at each turn.

Unlike his peers in Romania and Hungary, Gomulka made no attempt to exploit Khrushchev's second round of de-Stalinization or the bourgeoning Sino-Soviet dispute to his country's domestic or international advantage. By 1967, his unimaginative policies had resulted in a miasma of political repression, economic stagnation, stifling bureaucratization, and moral corruption. In June of that year, Israel's victory over Moscow's unpopular Arab clients and the subsequent campaign against "Zionist" elements in the ruling parties of Eastern Europe opened the way for a virtual result of the frustrated younger generation of PUWP functionaries against the Gomulka leadership. Focusing their attack on Gomulka's suddenly vulnerable Jewish supporters in the party and governmental bureaucracies, some of these tough, young, and relatively nationalistic officials rallied to the hardline PUWP faction headed by security chief Mieczyslaw Moczar. Others, equally tough but generally more sophisticated and more concerned with seeking practical remedies for Poland's mounting social and economic problems, clustered around Gierek.

As indicated earlier, a number of factors eventually combined to enable Gomulka to turn back this challenge and to reimpose a semblance of stability under his leadership at the 5th PUWP Congress in October 1968. But once this had been accomplished, he once again allowed his attention to be diverted from his country's domestic problems. This time, the object of his concern was Bonn. In 1967, Gomulka's dismay over Romania's action in establishing diplomatic relations with the Federal Republic of Germany and his abiding fear that Moscow - then still the role guarantor of Poland's western frontier - might someday reach an accommodation with Bonn at Warsaw's expense had prompted him to sign a number of "solidarity" agreements with his East European allies that had effectively tied his own hands in dealing with the West Germans. He had quickly recognized his mistake, but his initial efforts to jettison the burden of this multilateral approach had been interrupted by Poland's party crisis. Now, Gomulka was determined to lose no more time. With Moscow's approval and the active encouragement of the newly coopted young Turk elements in his regime, he labored to secure a negotiated settlement of the issues - particularly the emotion-laden question of the Oder-Neisse frontier - which had long impeded the development of normal political and economic relations between Poland and the Federal Republic of Germany and, to a lesser degree, between Poland and all of the NATO powers. These negotiations were protracted, and Gomulka's continued neglect of problems closer to home ultimately resulted in his downfall. But the long-awaited Polish-West German agreement was finally signed on 7 December 1970. It was the last - but by no means the leas sufficient - positive element to be included in the Gomulka legacy.

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