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 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA-RDP01-00707R000200070023-3

J. Public information (C)

1. The role of government

The Communist regime controls all information media—the press, publishing houses, radio, television, and films. Although the degree of control and its administrative channels vary, all media—whether or not they are direct organs of the Communist party—are ultimately subject to the same criteria of content and are, therefore, expressive of government policy.

The party has relied heavily on all news media, especially the press, radio, and television, to further its political, economic, and social goals. Rapid postwar expansion of radio and TV broadcasting facilities, together with the increasing availability of radio and TV receivers, has made these the most important channels of public information. Newspapers, periodicals, and books are also major sources. As in other Communist countries, there is also a heavy reliance on word-of-mouth communications, with the prevalence of rumor and gossip being in proportion to the degree of censorship imposed by the party on formal media.

Despite controls over the form, content, and dissemination of public information, the regime has had little success in curbing the anti-Communist attitudes of the people, and their desire to seek out unbiased information. As part of the de-Stalinization campaign after 1954, censorship controls waned and relative freedom of expression by the individual and the press—nourished by the political ferment of 1956-57—for the first time since the Communist takeover. Censorship control of all media was soon reapplied and became increasingly stringent during the 1960's. Party control of all media tended to become more direct but, in response to intraparty political fluctuations, more arbitrary and the content more unreliable. Nevertheless, when judged against the standards of control and objectivity existing elsewhere, for example, in the U.S.S.R., the Gomulka regime's policy toward the information media was relatively permissive.

Most of the shifts in public information policy undertaken by the Gierek regime stem from the lessons learned during the workers' revolt of December 1970, i.e., that public trust rests on more honest information provided by the government to the people, coupled to evidence of governmental responsiveness to public opinion. Although Gierek has clearly retained firm control of the media, he feels that more open discussion of domestic problems serves as a safety valve for popular dissatisfaction, a means to overcome public apathy, and a catalyst for constructive change. Soon after he took over, Gierek established a permanent cabinet-level post of Under Secretary of State for Information who regularly reports to the press on the proceedings of the government, and submits to questions—often pointed—by journalists. Gierek has also tolerated, and in some cases encouraged, publication of mildly provocative articles in the press. Although the media do not question the role of the party or the permanence of the socialist system in Poland, they have prompted discussion of long-range social and economic options facing the country. In this way Gierek has brought public discussion to bear on the tasks that are being thrashed out within the regime. Moreover, the public dialog is open, and employs methods that are unique in the Communist world. For example, cabinet ministers, party leaders, and leaders of mass organizations have submitted to critical interviews on radio and television, including questions submitted by the listening audience while the program is on the air.

Formally, however, the apparatus of control over the media has remained unaltered. Regime control over public information is exercised by a number of methods, the chief among them being the mandatory prior clearance of the contents of a publication by the Central Office for Control of Press, Publications, and Public Performances, popularly known as censura (censorship) in Warsaw, and by its provincial and municipal agencies throughout the country. Censura's powers also extend to all verbal and graphic media, i.e., radio, television, and films. The dominant source of current news distributed to all media is the official Polish Press Agency (PAP), constituting in itself a form of censorship. Film censorship is facilitated by the regime's control over all domestic film production and over the export and import of films. While censura is theoretically a government agency, in practice it is subordinate to the Press Bureau of the party's Central Committee, which sets the political line for all informational media.

The basic themes and approach for the media in their role of supporting the regime's domestic and foreign policy goals are, therefore, decided at the highest party level. They are then further elaborated by the Propaganda and Agitation Department of the Central Committee and transmitted to key party individuals in the press, radio, television, government agencies such as the main censorship office, and various ministries and mass organizations. How well this detailed guidance is implemented is dependent on the competence of the individual responsible for such implementation within each organization, as well as

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APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA-RDP01-00707R000200070023-3