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'''FIGURE 33. Leading members of the Roman Catholic hierarchy in Wroclaw Cathedral, May 1970. From left: Archbishop Baraniak of Poznan; Koral Cardinal Wojtyla of Krakow; Stefan Cardinal Wyszynski of Warsaw, Primate of Poland; Archbishop Kominek of Wroclaw (elevated to Cardinal in March 1973); and Bishop Kafwa of Lublin. (U/OU)''' (picture)

'''FIGURE 34. Administrative divisions, Roman Catholic Church, 1972 (U/OU)'''

theological seminaries, 553 monasteries with 7,754 monks, and 2,610 convents with 27,807 nuns. The church also operates the prestigious Catholic University of Lublin—the only religious institution of higher learning in the Communist world—and a number of schools, orphanages, old-age homes, and other institutions and social welfare.

In sharp contrast to the interwar period when the nature of the state and the fundamental laws of the land insured the Catholic Church a privileged secular as well as religious position, the postwar Communist regime effected not only a separation of the church and state—a principal which is contested by Cardinal Wyszynski—but sought to eliminate the church as an institution wielding social and political influence. In this, the regime's policy was, as it continues to be, formulated on the highest levels of the party leadership, and implemented by the governmental Office of Religious Affairs. This office is directly subordinate to the Premier, but is known to have closely cooperated with the Polish security apparatus in times of church-state tensions. In this conflict with the church, the regime also has used several specialized organizations and institutions, generally dedicated to proregime proselytizing under the guise of a rationalist philosophy. Among these is the quasi-Catholic and economically strong PAX organization, which under the leadership of its charismatic and ex-Fascist leader, Boleslaw Piasecki, generally supports regime positions but is known to seek power for its own sake. Like its weaker offshoot, the so-called Christian Social Association, PAX is not connected with the Roman Catholic Church and has been unsuccessful in diluting the influence of the church among the people. Similarly, the regime has had little success in promoting the concept of "patriotic priests," i.e., generally parish-level clergy who would support regime positions in contravention of the official stand by the Roman Catholic episcopate. Wholly secular mass organizations propagating antireligious views included, until 1969, the Association of Freethinkers and Atheists, and the Lay School Society, the two merged in April of that year to form the Society for the Propagation of Lay Culture. The merger was in fact a regime effort the reverse the poor record of achievement of the two organizations working separately.

In contrast to the multifaceted antireligious apparatus of the state, the church for many years has been deprived of virtually all means of speaking out except from the pulpit—but it has used this right with telling effect. There are no mass Catholic organizations in the country. Of the few lay Catholic organizations, the most significant is the group of Catholic parliamentary deputies Znak (Sign). In the immediate post-1956 period, Znak was the closest

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