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completed in late 1969, but, because of the intervention of the December 1970 crisis, it was never submitted to the CRZZ for formal approval. The revision of the draft under Gierek's regime was never widely publicized nor debated, but it was evidently to include provisions on working hours and leave, hiring and dismissal, wages, working conditions, industrial health and safety, apprenticeship, labor discipline, grievances and disputes, and trade union activities. It was expected to break little new ground in labor legislation, however, with the exception of sterner provisions in the area of labor discipline violations—such as abuse of sick leave, which is prevalent—and in the area of working time, where a workweek of 44 hours or less was likely to be formally promulgated as a goal.

Not surprisingly, in view of the controversy the draft labor code engendered at the congress, its provisions were barely publicized. Reporting on the proceedings of the congress' subcommittee on the labor code, the Polish press stated that while delegates "spoke approvingly" of some of its aspects, other provisions "gave rise to controversy." Trade union sources privately stated that the congress delegates were in fact very critical of the draft labor code, and found its guarantees of worker and trade union rights too narrow and too vaguely defined. As a result, the code will have to be redrafted.

Apart from dissatisfaction with the labor code, there was reportedly also heated discussions in other congress subcommittees as well. These events together confirm other evidence that while Polish labor is pleased with improved economic conditions and with Gierek's emphasis on consumer welfare, it is determined to exercise and to safeguard its newly found political influence. The regime's effort to boost trade union prestige has been designed in part to encourage the workers to view the unions as a legitimate vehicle for the articulation of the grievances, and thus to institutionalize, and gain control over, the workers' activity. In this effort, the regime apparently succeeded only too well; the rejection of the labor code attests to the workers' willingness to use the trade unions to make their views known, even to the discomfiture of the regime.

This willingness of the workers to make their voices heard and of the regime to tolerate them illustrates dramatically that it is not new institutional forms but rather a changed political climate that differentiates Gierek's Poland from that of Gomulka. By keeping the top echelons of the trade union movement structurally unchanged and ensuring party control, Gierek maintains the movement's ideologically orthodox public image. At the same time, he has encouraged the lower echelons of the trade unions to become more representative of and a voice for, the workers' interests—ultimately helping the party to keep a thumb on the pulse of labor in ways that Gomulka never believed necessary.

The new system already shows promise. labor disputes continue to exist, and are apparently resolved in a give-and-take manner. Sporadic work stoppages and strikes (which were banned under Gomulka although no legal prohibition against them exists) continue to occur and are tolerated. Moreover, such methods apparently are used by workers, in moderation, to get minor grievances settled, and no one is punished. These innovative developments in the labor field, while always holding some danger for the image if not the power of the regime, illustrate the new pragmatism of the Gierek regime, which is tolerating and in some ways encouraging the growth of a more unorthodox and vital society.

E. Living conditions and social problems

1. Material welfare (U/OU)

The revolt of the consumers that shook Poland to its political roots in December 1970 was the direct result of pent-up popular frustrations arising from the awareness that despite the postwar acquisition of valuable industrialized territory in the former German Silesian areas and a vast industrialization drive by the Polish Communist regime, the material welfare of the people remained well below the level commensurate with national resources and productive capabilities.

Although the regime has claimed consistent increases in the indicators of material welfare throughout the postwar period, there has been a marked gap between the growth of the per capita gross national product (GNP) and the increase in per capita consumption. This gap has been only a partial measure of the persistent priority granted to investment in heavy industry—at the expense of the consumer—despite some reduction in this ratio in favor of consumer goods after 1956. The tangible measures taken and the socio-economic commitments made since December 1970 by the Gierek regime indicate that these priorities will be modified in order to allocate a greater share of national resources to production of consumer goods and services.

The December 1970 upheaval was not caused by unbearable living conditions or hunger; indeed, the position of the consumer had improved steadily during the previous decade, and the average Pole was better off in 1970 than at any previous period. Nevertheless,

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