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to 2,300 zlotys (printing) in 1970. As is true in most industrialized countries, textiles and apparel were near the bottom of the industrial wage scale. Unskilled workers, many of them women, predominate in these branches, thus lowering the average wage level.

In other nonagricultural branches, average monthly wages in 1970 were highest in transportation and communications and lowest in health and in trade, as shown below (in zlotys):

In the 1960's, data on industrial wages by occupational grouping revealed the favored position of engineering-technical personnel, and showed a perceptible improvement in the earnings of administrative-clerical personnel. In 1970 the average monthly wages of engineering-technical personnel in industry were 3,847 zlotys, compared with 2,552 zlotys for administrative-clerical personnel and 2,515 zlotys for blue-collar workers. The indexes of earnings of each group, with those of blue-collar workers as the base, are shown below:

The slight decline in this favored position during the last 2 years of the decade reflected a policy of gradual leveling of earnings, as well as more than proportionate increases in blue-collar wages. This is a trend to which the new Gierek regime is even more forcefully committed.

Money wages rose steadily after World War II, but real wages rose much more slowly. Money wages and real wages moved in opposite directions in 1952-53 and again in 1960 (Figure 21), as sharply rising prices outstripped the average increase in pay. In 1965, a modest pay increase was wiped out entirely by higher prices, and real wages failed to rise. The annual rate of increase in both money and real wages fluctuated erratically during the 1950's, and until 1958 was frequently very high. Since 1960 both rates have tended to stabilize at a much lower level. Money wages rose at an average annual rate of 3.7% in 1960-70, and real wages at a rate of 1.8%.

'''FIGURE 21. Index of money wages and real wages in the socialist sector of the economy (U/OU)''' (chart/graph)

The ill-timed price rises of 13 December 1970 were, in fact, part of a series of economically defensible attempts by the Gomulka regime to initiate economic reform and to tackle the country's deep-seated malaise. Indeed, since taking power, the Gierek regime has not totally repudiated the general basis of Gomulka's reform program, but it is changing the scope, thrust, and emphasis of the reform and, above all, is seeking to avoid the errors of its predecessor: that of extreme insensitivity to the social and political context within which reforms must be implemented.

This insensitivity was illustrated by the events of late 1970. Although in May 1970 the party had approved a new system of material incentives based on the principle that workers' earnings should reflect the economic performance of individual enterprises, Gomulka had postponed any wage increases until mid-1972 because of the unexpected food shortages and the perennial shortage of other consumer goods. To the workers, especially those in the shipyards, the new system clearly seemed to be the same as a 2-year wage freeze. When this explosive mixture of popular discontent was ignited by the December 1970 price increases, Gomulka looked on the revolt as a counterrevolution which should be suppressed by force. However, a coalition of certain members of Gomulka's own leadership, a portion of the party apparatus, and the army hierarchy opposed this

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