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 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA-RDP01-00707R000200070023-3

'''FIGURE 5. The Warsaw Nike (U/OU)''' (picture)

these factors the reliability of the enlisted ranks of the armed forces must be considered as largely dependent on the issues and circumstances of any future conflict, the nationality of opposing forces, and the magnitude of a direct threat to Polish territory. There were, for example, significant morale problems among Polish military units which took part in the Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia. Moreover, during the 1970 workers' uprisings along the Baltic coast, Polish regular army units (as distinct from the police and militarized internal security units) reportedly were neither ordered to, nor would have, fired on the workers. Indeed, the behavior of the military establishment of all ranks in 1970 appears to have mitigated the general postwar low esteem in which the military is held by the people, and opened the way toward somewhat greater military influence in national affairs.

Despite the success of the workers in 1970 in essentially overthrowing one Communist regime and seating another, most other elements of society are aware that the development resulted from the action of but one class and with the aid of fortuitous circumstances. While the people are newly aware that popular opinion can effect change in the system—indeed, this principle has been embraced by the Gierek regime—the 1970 events have not substantially increased the militancy of the society as a whole.

The Polish outlook in the early 1970's is, therefore, hopeful but tempered by a down-to-earth realism which has been as prevalent in the nation's history as the more publicized bouts of romantic idealism. This is most acutely reflected in the attitudes of the youth. In terms of specific beliefs, educated Polish youth tend to favor the Western European type of social democracy as a political and social order, nonsectarianism in religion, and experimental freedom in art. They tend toward individual rather than collective responsibility in social relations, and toward supranationalism based on a combination of Polish nationalism and allegiance to Europe as an entity.

Although the Gierek regime may be no more successful than its predecessor in meeting the aspirations of the youth, it has acted on its commitment to bridge the generation gap by increasing the influence of ambitious and qualified members of the younger generation in policymaking and generally giving the youth a greater stake in the system. In doing so, it also hopes to eliminate the youth's remaining potential for revolutionary in contrast to evolutionary change. If the government succeeds in providing a tangible increase in living standards and maintains its rapport for the workers, the working class is unlikely to jeopardize its gains by new militancy. Moreover, the powerful Roman Catholic Church in Poland ceased in the late 1960's to fan the spirit of militant opposition to the regime. In 1968, for example, the church did not take a strong stand against the official anti-Semitic campaign, nor against the invasion of Czechoslovakia. In 1970 it did not inject itself in any significant measure into the confrontation between the workers and the regime. With church-state relations progressing toward a probable formal accommodation since the advent of the Gierek regime, the church in Poland appears no longer to be a force inducing anti-Communist militancy among the people.

C. Population (C)

1. General trends

The characteristics of Poland's postwar population and its vital trends have been largely the result of wartime population and territorial losses and shifts, heavy postwar urbanization, and, since 1955, a steadily declining birth rate, at least initially encouraged by the government's policy of family

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APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA-RDP01-00707R000200070023-3