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against the regime's tangible economic blunders, they were not joined by either the students or the intellectuals in any significant numbers. This feature of the revolt, however, was a disguised blessing since the regime was prevented from once again exploiting class differences for its own ends, and was left for all to see as pitted solely against the class upon whose mandate Communist rule theoretically depended. This situation, untenable either in real or ideological terms, caused the internally chaotic, weakened, and isolated Gomulka regime—devoid of Soviet support—to fall of its own weight.

The attributes of the Gomulka regime in its later years also bore witness to a long-developing social split—basically generational—within the Communist hierarchy. The fluid upper class which had emerged under postwar Communist rule consisted of the high party and government leaders themselves, heads of mass organizations, managers of state enterprises, and others who owed their social ascendancy to the Communist regime. The existence of this class, however, had little impact on the traditional standing of other social classes. Its control over national life and material well-being was resented, and it generally carried no real prestige within the society. Moreover, the rising age structure of this class, internecine warfare within it, and its demonstrable policy failures opened its ranks to increasing inroads by the younger generation of tough but less ideologically hidebound managers and technocrats.

The rise of this managerial and technocratic component of the ruling elite—younger, more forward-looking, and in touch with social, political, and economic reality is symbolized by the Gierek regime. Cutting across class lines to include members of the middle echelon of the economic bureaucracy and other young professionals, this group had given evidence even before 1970 of developing into a new class in its own right, one based on administrative and technical competence rather than on political considerations. The Gierek regime's public commitment to precisely these attributes in all aspects of national life promises not only to foster the growth but also the self-identity of this incipient social class.

Because this growing social class has tended to give priority to national self-interest and public welfare in general, to the detriment of both Communist ideology and institutional forms, it has earned the respect and increasing allegiance of other classes. This is particularly true of the educated youth of all class origins, a fact heavily counted on by the government in its efforts to engage the support of the new generation. This youth already forms the main component of the new technocratic class, having been absorbed into it at its lower levels. With the passage of time, this class, in close alliance with the skilled workers, will probably become the dominant class of Polish society.

4. National attitudes (C)

Polish national attitudes, both individual and collective have been formed through centuries of struggle for national survival and are characterized by strong nationalism, tenacity of purpose, and adherence to those social and cultural traditions which have been instrumental in preserving the national identity. Together with the Roman Catholic Church, which has played a central role in shaping and maintaining national consciousness, these factors have consistent militated against the achievement of Communist objectives in Poland. As a people, the Poles value originality in the individual but tend to be conservative when acting collectively. This contradiction, together with a chronic feeling of national insecurity, has long thwarted effective political rule. If the Poles were described in the interwar period as a people "charmingly impossibly to govern," then even more so in the postwar period they must rank among the worlds most unnatural Communists.

These prevailing attitudes parallel the basic postwar conflict between the traditional value system of European humanism that emphasizes individual worth and the atheistic and collectivist orientation of Marxism. The confrontation in Poland between these two value systems had also been characterized by interplay and cooperation. In each system, apart from the highly antagonistic ideological mainstream, there is an articulate minority current which allows some convergence with the other despite irreconcilable differences. In the traditional system, for example, "open Catholicism" advocates cooperation with the regime on practical matters and seeks adjustment to social change, in contrast to the dogmatic, formalistic Polish Catholicism entrenched in the countryside and at the top of the Roman Catholic hierarchy. Within the Communist system, various "revisionist" currents have long been concerned with creating a "socialist humanism" suffused with nonideological, technological efficiency which would focus on the problems and needs of the individual. Although untainted by revisionism in ideological terms, the new Polish regime of Edward Gierek typifies one such current.

Probably the most fundamental task of the new leadership is to reassert the moral authority of the rulers vis-a-vis the ruled, and to bridge the gulf long separating the two with a new sense of participation

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