Page:CAB Aviation Accident Report, Mid-Air Collision on 15 December 1959.pdf/4

- 4 - As the flight crossed the airport above runway 26 Lt. Anderson asked for a "simulated flameout pattern." The tower approved the request; however, Captain Meckem, about this time, informed Lt. Anderson he had insufficient fuel for the maneuver prior to landing. Lt Anderson, therefore, transmitted to him, "Let's enter on initial and join on the turn." This transmission in jet fighter parlance meant the simulated flameout would not be made, the flight would proceed to the initial point, enter the initial approach, and land. It also meant for Captain Mackem to join in close formation. Although the tower was not directly informed of the intention the controller said he overheard the transmission and understood the meaning.

The tower controller stated he watched the low approach and saw the jet flight make an approximate 30-degree right turn just past the end of the runway. This was in conformity with a noise-abatement procedure to avoid flying over the Ft. Warren hospital. He stated that he watched the flight then continue outside the traffic pattern limits in a left climbing turn. At this time the controller turned his attention to a T-33 which was in the traffic pattern for landing. The controller indicated that the next call from the jet flight would occur when it entered the tactical pattern at the initial point for runway 26.

The testimony of Lt Anderson was in agreement. He stated that his flight passed well to the right of the Ft. Warren hospital, located two-three miles beyond the end of the runway. He stated that approximately abeam of the hospital he began a left turn. He said it was a climbing turn and that the climb was started after the ILS was finished, power was applied, and the aircraft was clearly accelerating with gear and flaps up. The left bank was 30 degrees. Lt. Anderson continued the left turn to 110 degrees, interrupting it once on a heading of about 180 degrees to clear the turn Captain Meckem closed in the turn to close formation. He took position on Lt. Anderson's right wing with his aircraft slightly below the level of Lt. Anderson's with four to five feet wing—tip separation. Fore and aft he flew the "slat line." As the turn progressed the flight accelerated to 270 knots indicated airspeed.

Because precision, planning, and coordinated smoothness were important considerations in a satisfactory performance of the evaluation, Lt. Anderson planned to reach 9,000 feet, 270 knots, and the 110-degree heading simultaneously. For all practical purposes this was done and both pilots estimated that it occurred about 30 seconds before the collision. The pilots testified it was clear to them that at this point Lt. Anderson was the formation leader and Captain Meckem was the wingman. Accordingly, because flying formation requires the wingman's undivided attention to the leader, the responsibility to see and avoid other aircraft was entirely that of the formation leader. This is in accordance with Civil Air Regulations and military directives.