Page:CAB Aircraft Accident Report, American Airlines Flight 320.pdf/23



The Board notes that the carrier introduced an aircraft containing the many novel systems and characteristics of the Electra. without having previously established a comprehensive aircraft simulator program. The carrier has not yet procured an approved Electra simulator. Certainly there is little question that the present state of the art and the benefits to be derived from the use of simulators indicate the desirability of utilizing simulators prior to the introduction of the aircraft into air carrier service.

Whether or not any of the many factors which have been discussed in this report are of themselves critically related to this accident, we believe that their accumulative effect is significant—so significant in fact, that the extent to which they appear to compromise the safety of Electra operations must be seriously regarded. We are also of the view that almost all adverse operational aspects of new and substantially different equipment, systems, and procedures, could have been avoided through more comprehensive training in an aircraft simulator.

The Board has on previous occasion indicated its concern over the need for vigorous and comprehensive aircraft simulator programs in air carrier operations. The introduction of the Electra has increased our concern in this respect. Accordingly, we have recommended that the Federal Aviation Agency give immediate consideration to the adoption of a requirement that any air carrier planning to introduce into service an aircraft type containing equipment, systems, or characteristics significantly different from those of predecessor aircraft, shall be required to institute an approved aircraft simulator program the completion of which shall be required before any pilot may be assigned as pilot-in-command in air transportation.

In 1957 the Civil Aeronautics Board adopted an amendment to the Civil Air Regulations which required the installation of a device on certain aircraft used in air transportation for the purpose of recording continuously during flight, time, airspeed, altitude, vertical acceleration, and heading. This requirement met with considerable opposition in the aviation industry and serious consideration was given by the Board to the question whether the potential value of this device justified the cost of procurement, installation, and maintenance. The Board finally concluded that only the larger turbine-engine aircraft intended for operation in completely new environments would justify the expense of providing flight recorders. To define such aircraft types the Board relied upon a simple criterion—such recorders would be required in aircraft certificated for flight above 25,000 feet. Although the Electra is capable of flight above 25,000 feet, the carrier chose to request certification below 25,000 feet under which limitation it is unnecessary to install flight recorders. The probability that this would be done was known to the Board at the time the regulation was written. However, the Board concluded that the regulation, then promulgated, represented the most demanding requirement which could be justified on the basis of the than existing state of the art.

Clearly, a flight recorder in this aircraft would have enabled us to identify the causal factors involved in this accident with far greater precision than is now possible. The Board is of the view that the quality of flight recording systems which are available to the industry warrants the conclusion that no large aircraft introduced into air carrier service should be without a recorder. Accordingly, the Board is recommending that the FAA initiate action to amend the appropriate regulations to require that all large turbine-engine aircraft used in air transportation be equipped with flight recorders.