Page:CAB Accident Report, Western Air Lines Flight 221.pdf/11

 that touchdown actually occurred between 2,000 and 2,400 feet, beyond the runway threshold.

As was shown in the performance manual, the DC-6B is capable of a 725 feet/min. climb while in the landing configuration, utilizing takeoff power on all engines, and maintaining 100 knots indicated airspeed.

In order to establish a climb from a level attitude on the runway, with takeoff power applied for a go-around, and flaps extended 50 degrees, a five-degree noseup rotation of the aircraft is required. As the flaps are retracted from the 50-degree to the 20-degree position an additional three-degree rotation, or approximately eight-degree noseup attitude 18 required to maintain climb.

As was evidenced by the absence of tail skid contact with the runway, the longitudinal attitude of the aircraft was less than five degrees noseup at impact. It is concluded, therefore, the aircraft was not rotated a sufficient amount to maintain a positive rate of climb during or after the transition of the flaps to the 20-degree position.

It was concluded that the landing gear was in the process of retraction at the time the aircraft settled onto the runway with its Nos. 1 and 2 propellers. Had the landing gear been in the down and locked position the aircraft, in all probability, would have bounced off the runway and continued the climbout with little or no damage incurred.

According to the crew, landing gear retraction was not called for, nor was the landing gear handle placed in the up position until after the impact had occurred. However, design specifications of the aircraft are such that propeller contact as occurred in this instance would not be possible with the landing gear extended and locked without prior damage to the gear. Therefore, the Board can only conclude that the landing gear handle was, in fact, placed in the retract position shortly after initial lift-off for the go-around by either the first or second officer.

Because there were conflicting company procedures in effect regarding the sequence of landing gear and flap retraction during go-around, it is possible that a lack of crew coordination and understanding concerning these procedures existed. This was further demonstrated in that the first officer assumed the duties of the second officer during the go-around by placing the r.p.m. control forward prior to retracting the flaps to 20 degrees. Operations Memorandum 63-27, issued approximately one month prior to this accident, placed the responsibility of landing gear extension and retraction on the first officer and the setting of engine power on the second officer. It stated that a briefing concerning these changes in crew duties should be given by the captain prior to takeoff.

Because the memorandum had only been in effect a short time plus the fact that the crew was operating together for the first time, it is believed that a briefing by the captain outlining the changes in duties should have been conducted prior to this flight.