Page:CAB Accident Report, United Airlines Flight 21.pdf/68

 immediate landing caused him to make this choice. As was stated previously in this report, all the evidence leads to a contrary conclusion, particularly the testimony of the Airport Control Tower operator who said that in reporting that the northwest runway would be used, First Officer Young did not report any mechanical difficulty and his voice did not indicate any anxiety or excitement.

From the testimony of eye-witnesses, it may be concluded that the final approach of United 21 to the northwest runway was made normally until the left wing dropped and was followed by the crash. The maneuvers of the airplane as described by these witnesses also lead to the conclusion that for some reason the airplane stalled, whipped off to the left, and was in an incipient spin when it struck.

It is important to inquire whether this stall and the resulting crash were caused by an inadvertent act or failure on the part of Captain Scott or by occurrences beyond his control. The normal landing procedure for the northwest runway at Chicago is to make an approach for landing as low and with as little excess speed as possible. Mr. Addems, Superintendent of Flight Operations for United, testified that under normal conditions the approach to the northwest runway must be made with extreme accuracy. The pilot must come over the boundary with a minimum of speed and at a height of not more than 25 to 30 feet above the high tension wires bounding the field. It is reasonable to believe, therefore, that Captain Scott, after choosing the northwest runway under the unfavorable conditions existing, would attempt to make his approach at as low an altitude as possible and at a minimum possible flying speed in order to avoid overshooting the runway.