Page:CAB Accident Report, US Overseas Airlines C-54-G crash (15 October 1959).pdf/4

 "CAUTION - Before takeoff, check operation of each engine on all eight main and auxiliary tanks"

"Takeoff on man tanks, cruise on auxiliary tanks, then back to main tanks for landing."

The company operations manual specifies that fuel will be used out of auxiliary tanks to an indicated minimum of 50 gallons and that remaining fuel may be used one tank to an engine at a time.

No reference was found in the operations or flight manuals regarding the different configurations of C-54 fuel system and fuel selector positions.

Captain Reid had flown C-54 aircraft 7,303 hours, 6,500 of which were as captain. The flight records of Captain Read indicated that since his employment with U. S. Overseas Aarlines July 21, 1958, he had completed 240 flying hours C-54-B series aircraft and 233 flying hours in C-54-₴ and G aircraft. His last previous flight was in a C-54-E series aircraft.

Copilot Cole had a total flying time of 9,024 hours, of which 255 hours were in C-54 aircraft. He had flown 69:45 hours in C-54 aircraft during the previous 30 days. He had flown a total of 209 hours in C-54-B series aircraft and 46:55 hours in C-54-E and G series aircraft.

The recorded weather at the time of the accident was: broken clouds at 2,500 feet, 10,000 feet overcast; visibility three miles in fog and smoke. However, according to verbal statements of the captain, the actual weather was scattered clouds with visibility unlimited and the moon fully visible. A U. S. Navy aircraft circling the wreckage shortly after the accident reported weather conditions as broken clouds at an estimated 3,000 feet and visibility 10 miles.

Analysis and Conclusions

An analysis of all evidence indicates that the accident resulted from fuel exhaustion due to positioning the fuel tank selectors to virtually empty tanks prior to takeoff. The 25 to 50 gallons of fuel in each auxiliary tank was sufficient to take off and reach the accident site and the No. 1 fuel tank contained slightly more fuel than the others. It is also obvious that the copilot did not move the fuel selectors during the emergency, as considered possible by the captain, but mistakenly considered himself to be in a 6-fuel-tank aircraft and believed, therefore, that the forward fuel selector positions were correct for the main fuel tanks and merely made sure that they were positioned to the forward detents as found.

The flight crew suspected improper or contaminated fuel but that area was thoroughly explored and completely eliminated by the various laboratory analyses of fuel samples and investigation of airport fuel handling and dispensing. The main fuel tanks were filled to a total of 951 gallons but the four auxiliary fuel tanks were not. Only 25 to 50 gallons of fuel remained in each of these tanks as indicated by the gauges when checked by the previous flight crew.

While at 10 not unreasonable for the captain to have considered the possibility of improper fuel as a reason for the loss of power, the Board believes it should not have been accepted to the exclusion of fuel starvation. Fluctuation of fuel pressure and fuel flow should have alerted the captain to the actual difficulty, particularly