Page:CAB Accident Report, TWA Flight 595.pdf/4

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(SO percent extenSion), and "Landing" (100 percent extenSion) There are lever— pOSition detents at the above—mentioned settings except the “ApprOach“ position. There is also a detent at the full forward (fully retracted) pos1tion The wing flap control lever will remain in any selected peeition until moved whether in the detent or not The wing flap control unit allows pro—positioning of the flaps and changing direction of the flap movement at any time without completing the selected cycle. Retraction time for the wing flaps from a setting of 60 percent to fully retracted is aboum 15 seconds prov1ded the landing gear is not retracted at the same time

Examination further revealed the No 2 engine had been shut down and its propeller feathered. There was no eVidence of any inflight fire, however, the fire extinguisher had been activated in the No 2 engine. The ground fire and impact damage precluded any testing of the fire warning system serVing the No 2 engine. Engines Nos 1, 3, and 4 appeared to bein good condition aSide from impact damage There was no eVidence of structural failure prior to impact or any indication tnat the cargo may have shifted Upon impact, a Jet engine weigh— ing 5,880 pounds was torn directly from its tie—down pOSition in the cargo com— partment and thrown clear of the wreckage

On January 23, 1960, a test flight in the same type aircraft was conducted by the Lockheed Aircraft Corporation at Los Angeles, California. Conditions surrounding the fatal flight were Simulated as nearly as posSible. Definite stall warnings were apparent to the pilot in all of the test runs and recoveries from the stall buffet zone could be made with a loss of no more than 200 feet of altitude. On one of the runs the aircraft was banked up to 42 degrees and the airspeed allowed to drop to 108 knots indicated A fairly rapid rate of Sink developed and the aircraft was not yet in the stall buffet zone Not enough power was available to keep the aircraft in level flight and a loss of several hundred feet was necessary to acquire enough airSpeed to recover from this Sinking con— dition. The pilot described the aircraft as being on the backside of the power curve

On this flight the wing flaps were retracted from 60 percent to 0 percent and from SO percent to 0 percent. Simultaneously with these flap retractions the landing gear was retracted from the "down and locked” to the "up and locked” peeition The retraction times respectively were as follows Flaps- 21 seconds; gear 19 seconds, flaps 24 seconds; gear 15 seconds.

AnalySis and ConcluSicns

The flight had progressed from.New York to Chicago in a normal manner Ground handling of the aircraft at Midway Airport was properly conducted but difficulty with equipment caused a delay in loading of the aircraft cargo compartment which, in turn, caused the flight to be behind schedule. All documents and records per- taining to the status of the aircraft were in order and indicated the aircraft was airworthy and properly loaded.

The crew's training and profiCiency records indicate the crew members were properly qualified for the flight as planned. The company prov1ded ample oppor— tunity for them to obtain sufficient rest prior to their flight; however it appears questionable that the captain and flight engineer took full advantage of this opportunity