Page:CAB Accident Report, TWA Flight 595.pdf/3

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Sign}: seconds later, Flight 595 acknowledged its clearance to land on runway 31L with an "OK." Total elapsed time Since takeoff was then 2 minutes and 4’? secondg_ Forty—three seconds later the tower operator transmitted, "NO . NOE!" which he explained was a spontaneous exclamation upon seeing Flight 595 crash into the houses and burst into flames. A total time of 3 minutes and 30 seconds had then elapsed. The exact time of the crash was fixed at 0535 as that was the time the Comonwealth Edison Company of Chicago recorded the power failure resulting when Flight 595 hit their powerlines.

Ten minutes prior to the crash the United States Weather Bureau reported the Midway weather as follows Partial obscuration, scattered clouds at 600 feet, measured 900 foot overcast; VlSlblllty 3 miles; light rain, fog, and smoke; wind west 10 knots, temperature 39; dewpomt 38‘, and altimeter setting 29.33; Remarks: 2/10 of sky obscured by fog. The crew of an aircraft which took off about three minutes prior to 595's takeoff reported to Midway Tower about one minute before 1the accident that there were scud clouds west of the airport at 500 feet. Twenty minutes after the accident the overcast was reported at 600 feet and the ViSibility still 3 miles This latter observation was a routine Weather Bureau obsorvation at D555. The Weather Bureau did not make a speCial acc1dent observation because they were not notified of the acc1dent until 0605.

According to witnesses there was no ice being formed on anyr of the buildings or aircraft on the ground from the light rain that was falling at the time of the acuident

The total distance Flight 595 traveled over the ground from the beginning of its takeoff roll to the pond of impact was about eight statute miles. This flightpath was elliptical in shape and at no time was the aircraft more than two miles from the airport.* Ground observers all stated that their view of the aircraft was never obstructed by clouds.

According to witnesses, including tower personnel, the aircraft banked in excess of 45 degrees during the left turn to the final approach heading. It lost altitude as the turn progressed and when it reached an altitude described as Just above the tops of the trees the wings were almost level and the nose was raised slightly to a climbing attitude; however, the rate of descent continued until the aircraft struck the trees and buildings. Statements of witnesses along the flight‘ path and within one mile of the impact area indicated that the engines sounded as if they were laboring to keep the aircraft airborne.

Investigation of the wreckage indicated that the left main and nose gear assemblies were up but unlocked and the right main gear was up and locked. The wing flaps were extended symmetrically about 13 inches or 24 percent of their full travel, and the wing flap control valve and follow—up mechanism were peel—- tinned for flap movement toward the "up" peeition. The wing flap control lever was about one—eighth of an inch aft of the full forward peeition and bent over 30 degrees toward the captain's seat. It was JaIDEBd in that position as a nesmr.1t of the impact and appeared to have been in that peeition prior to impact as there Has no indication of the lever having been foreibly moved to or from the jammed peeition. The wing flap control lever is located on the top, right Side of the center control stand. There are four placarded pos1tions on the quadrant- “Take” off" (60 percent extenSion), "Approach" (66 percent extension) , "80 percent“


 * See diagram. of Probable Flight Path, Attachment 1.