Page:CAB Accident Report, TWA Flight 3 (January 1942).pdf/23




 * 1) The use of an erroneous compass course.
 * 2) Blackout of most of the beacons in the neighborhood of the accident made necessary by the war emergency.
 * 3) Failure of the pilot to comply with TWA's directive of July 17, 1941, issued in accordance with a suggestion from the Administrator of Civil Aeronautics requesting pilots to confine their flight movements to the actual on-course signals.

The investigation of this accident has indicated the need for more precise and specific operational procedures and regulatory standards with respect to contact night flight. Accordingly, the Board has submitted the following recommendation to the Administrator:

"'It is therefore recommended that the Administrator of Civil Aeronautics establish, for inclusion in the operations manual of air carriers, such contact flight procedures at each airport as will insure that the climb to, and descent from, cruising altitude be conducted at a safe distance from all obstructions.'"

As further remedial measures in this regard, the Board is now considering proposed regulations which would require night contact flights to (1) remain within the confines of the proper twilight zone of the on-course signal, and (2) fly at an altitude not less than 1000 feet above the highest obstacle within a horizontal distance of 10 miles from the center of the course intended to be flown.

The preparation of flight plans obviously should be regarded as more than mere routine. The possibility of irregularities such as that