Page:CAB Accident Report, Pennsylvania-Central Airlines Flight 143.pdf/26

 make a gradual left turn into the small valley which extends into the range of hills south of the airport. This was, of course, not the flight path which would normally be followed after such a take-off toward the southwest.

It appears that there were four other possible courses of action open to him. He might have attempted to land straight ahead, but this would have necessitated passing under both high tension lines. It is doubtful that a safe landing could have been effected in this manner, inasmuch as a New York Central Railroad roadbed and the Kanawha River were directly in his flight path. He might have attempted to make a left turn over the river before reaching either high tension line so as to proceed eastward up the Kanawha Valley. This would have involved a steep bank at a dangerously low altitude and air speed and it is doubtful whether there was sufficient room for the turn between the point at which the right engine failed and the hills to the south of the Kanawha River. Also, he might have climbed straight ahead over both high tension lines, attempting to follow the normal flight path after such a take-off. This would have been a hazardous undertaking under the circumstances and might have resulted in striking the primary high tension line. Lastly, he might have attempted a right turn, but this would also have involved great danger of striking the primary high tension line. In view of the above, it seems that the decision made by Captain Wright was a wise one.

From his testimony it appears that Captain Wright thought, on the basis of PCA instructions, that he could not safely operate the engines after take-off, at a manifold pressure in excess of 34 inches and that, if he exceeded this amount of power for an appreciable length of time,